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Risk-Aware Access Control (RAAC) is a novel access control model that recently has emerged as
an important research subject as it addresses the increasing need of securely sharing information
in a dynamical environment. Given an access request, the goal of a RAAC system is to take a
decision performing a dynamic risk-analysis in order to manage the trade-off between the risk
incurred by granting a permission to a subject and the one incurred by not granting it. When a
risky access is allowed, the system can apply some mitigation methods. These are actions that
might be fulﬁlled by the system itself or by the requester with the goal of account for or reduce
the risk incurred by granting the access. We refer to these actions as system obligations and user
obligations respectively.
In this thesis, we propose an extension of an existing RAAC abstract model that supports
risk assessment, risk-aware authorisation decision making and the use of system and user obli-
gations as risk mitigation methods. We also propose an implementation of the extended abstract
model based on XACML, a standard that deﬁnes an XML-based language for the speciﬁcation
of access control policies, requests and responses together with a reference architecture for its
implementation. Speciﬁcally we deﬁne a set of XACML policies to encode the features of the
RAAC model and provide a concrete implementation of the reference architecture that supports
dynamical risk-assessment, and enforcement and monitoring of obligations.
We develop a novel Risk-Aware Group Based Access Control (RA-GBAC) model based on
the our previous RAAC model, in order to better support the sharing of information and permis-
sions in a dynamic collaborative environment. We introduce the notions of group and task, and
provide support for risk-aware activation of tasks. Speciﬁcally, a group of users can request a set
of permissions needed for the fulﬁlment of a common goal. A successful task activation could
result in a set of obligations imposed on all the members of the requesting group, which we called
collective obligations. We thus introduce support for speciﬁcation and monitoring of this kind of
obligation together with a mechanism to incentive group to the fulﬁlment of their obligations. We
also propose an improved XACML RAAC architecture that supports the implementation of access
control system based on our RA-GBAC model.Acknowledgements
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Introduction
With the term information security or computer security we refer to a set of mechanisms which
have the goal of protecting information against unauthorized accesses, uses or modiﬁcations. In
the last decades, computer system rapidly became a core part of most of the organizations’ infor-
mation systems. Nowadays they are often used to store and process large amount of sensitive data
which need to be preserved and protected from malicious access but, at the same time, to be avail-
able when needed by authorized users. Moreover, with the increasing diffusion of the Internet, that
allows and promotes the dynamic exchange of information, and the proliferation of technologies
like e-banking and e-commerce, computer security is becoming a key issue and has been receiving
a lot of interest by the research community.
Access control, in security, is a mechanism that allows a system administrator to deﬁne who
can perform some action or access some resources in a system and in what circumstances. The
main purpose of access control is to promote optimal and secure sharing and exchange of informa-
tion and resources according to the basic principles on information protection outlined by Saltzer
and Schroeder (1975). Of those principles, the ones related to access contol are:
 Fail-safe defaults principle: authorization decisions have to be based on permission rather
than exclusion. The default situation is the lack of authorization and the protection scheme
identiﬁes conditions under which access is permitted.
 Least privilege principle: at any time, a user has to be given all and only the permissions
that are necessary to perform his or her job function.
 Complete mediation principle: every access to every object must be checked for authority.
 Separation of privilege principle: a protection mechanism that requires two keys to unlock
it is more robust and ﬂexible than one that allows access to the presenter of only a single
key.
Three commonly known requirements that a well designed computer security system has to
guarantee are:
1. Conﬁdentiality: only authorized users may access some sensitive information.
2. Integrity: information should be protected from being improperly altered or deleted by
unauthorized users.1.1. MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW 9
3. Availability: information must be available to authorized users when needed.
Access control is critical to the satisfaction of both requirements 1 and 2. In this thesis we
discuss and propose some novel access control models.
Traditional access control systems are based on policies that statically deﬁne by whom and in
what circumstances a resource can be accessed. The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) (Departmentof Defense, 1985) deﬁnestwo different categoriesof access control system:
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). In a DAC system,
also called identity-based access control system (Bishop, 2003), every resource has an owner or
initiator who can determine who may or may not access to the resource (Department of Defense,
1985). Several research work has been done on the ﬁeld of DAC resulting in the deﬁnition of dif-
ferent models (Lampson, 1971; Graham and Denning, 1972; Sandhu, 1992; Harrison et al., 1976).
In a MAC system, the policies that deﬁne who can access to every resource is deﬁned or changed
only by an higher authority (usually a system administrator). These policies are usually based
on some inequality between certain attributes of the user and attributes of the resource(Sandhu,
1993). A well-know model that embodies the features of MAC is the Bell-LaPadula model (Bell
and LaPadula, 1975).
Inthelastdecadeanovelaccesscontrolparadigm, calledRoleBasedAccessControl(RBAC)
has attracted considerable research interest. The basic idea of RBAC is to introduce the concept
of a role, which acts as a “bridge” between users and permissions. RBAC greatly simpliﬁes
the management of permissions in an organization. More speciﬁcally, system administrators can
create roles according to the job functions performed in an organization, and then, assign users
to roles on the basis of their speciﬁc job responsibilities and qualiﬁcations. A set of permissions
is assigned to every roles based on the work-related activities. Over the years, there has been
a considerable number of models that have been developed for RBAC. The RBAC96 family of
models is undoubtedly the most well known model for RBAC (Sandhu et al., 1996), and provides
the basis for the recent ANSI RBAC standard (American National Standards Institute, 2004). It
consists on of four conceptual models that form a hierarchy: RBAC0 deﬁnes the basic features of
RBAC; RBAC1 and RBAC2 extend RBAC0 through the addition of role hierarchy and constraints
respectively; and RBAC3 includes all the features of RBAC1 and RBAC2.
1.1 Motivation and overview
We believe that the traditional access control models don’t correctly address the increasing need
of a ﬂexible access control mechanism. Speciﬁcally:
 Most often, the traditional authorisation policies are too rigid to handle the exceptional or
emergence situation in which access rights should be appropriately overridden in order to
proceed business functionality.
 They don’t address the requirements of dynamic secure information and permission shar-
ing addressed by today’s collaborative environments. For example it could be reasonable,
in some cases, to let a user access to some permissions to which he would normally not
be allowed, when he is acting in behalf of a group of users that are collaborating for the
fulﬁlment of a common goal.1.1. MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW 10
 They are not ﬂexible enough to deal with the changing behaviour of the users and the so
called “insider threats”. If a user that is normally allowed to access to some sensitive in-
formation starts to behave in a suspicious way, the system should be able to detect these
changes in his behaviour and to limit the risk incurred by denying some of the permissions
associated with the user.
Recently, the design of risk-aware access control (RAAC) systems (Chen and Crampton,
2011; Chen et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2007; JASON Program Ofﬁce, 2004; Martinelli and Moris-
set, 2012) has become an important research ﬁeld as they were proposed to address the need to
enable access to resources and information in a dynamic environment. The core goal of developing
RAAC is to provide a mechanism that can manage the trade-off between the risk of allowing unau-
thorized access with the cost of denying access when the inability to access resources may have
profound consequences. Security systems based on RAAC are considered to be more permissive
as they allow some risky access that would be denied by traditional access control systems.
We can distinguish two different phases in the request evaluation process of a RAAC system:
1. The risk associated with the requested is assessed by the system. This phase usually returns
a numeric value that represents the risk incurred by the system allowing the request. When
assessing the risk value, many different factors should be considered by the system, like,
for example, the trustworthiness of the requesting user, the sensitivity of the data that was
requested and the criticality of the action that the user wants to execute.
2. Given the result of the risk assessment, the system has to decide whether to grant or to
deny the permission. The system administrator usually can deﬁne, for each permission,
a maximum risk threshold. If the assessed risk-value lies below the deﬁned threshold the
system grants the permission and eventually takes additional actions.
Usually, when a risky access is allowed, the system apply some risk mitigation methods.
These methods could include actions to be performed by the system itself to which we refer as
system obligation, or other actions referred to as user obligations that the user must perform before
or after the access request has been granted. An example risk mitigation method performed by the
systems could be logging requests for future review. User obligations can include requiring the
user to write a report in which he justify the requests, or to delete certain sensible data after use.
In January 2013 the OASIS standard organization proposed the XACML 3 (OASIS, 2013) as
astandardizedaccesscontrolpolicylanguage. SincethereleaseofXACML2(OASIS,2005b), the
standard has attracted lots of interest from the research community in the ﬁeld of the development
of traditional access control system as it promotes the separation of the decision point from the
enforcement point, allowing to re-use the same policies in different applications. Speciﬁcally, the
standard deﬁnes an XML-based language for the speciﬁcation of access control policies, requests
and responses, together with a reference architecture for the implementation of an XACML-based
access control system. It supports the deﬁnition of Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) poli-
cies and it provides policy proﬁles for the deﬁnition of different traditional access control models
(e.g. RBAC XACML proﬁle (OASIS, 2010)). However XACML doesn’t naturally support risk-
assessment and we believe that the actual reference architecture doesn’t allow to easily implement
RAAC system using the only standard feature of the policy language.1.2. CONTRIBUTION 11
1.2 Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
 Firstly we propose an implementation of an XACML-based RAAC system based on the
work by Chen et al. (2012), extending the reference XACML architecture in a modular
way. Unlike Chen et al. (2012), in this ﬁrst implementation we only support the use of
system obligation as risk mitigation methods. Speciﬁcally we implement an external risk-
assessment module that dynamically assesses the risk of a request and allow us to refer
to this value as a normal attribute. We show how to write standard XACML policies that
implements the risk mitigation strategies deﬁned in the RAAC abstract model.
 We propose an extended abstract model for risk-aware access control systems, based on
the work by Chen et al. (2012). This model supports both system and user obligations as
mitigation methods. Speciﬁcally, for every risk range of a risk mitigation strategy, we can
specify, a set of system and user obligations to be returned by the decision point. Since
user obligations, unlike system obligations, are not guaranteed to be fulﬁlled, we need to
introduce a mechanism that encourages the subjects in fulﬁlling their obligations. For this
reason, we introduce, for each subject a budget value. When he gets access to a permission
for which he needs to fulﬁl some obligations, a subject will have to deposit some of his
budget. In order to get back the deposit he will have to fulﬁl all of the returned obligations
before a speciﬁed deadline.
 We extend our XACML-based RAAC implementation to support the extended model. We
introduce support for the deposit of budget value and the speciﬁcation of user obligations in
the risk mitigation strategies. We implement a user obligation fulﬁlment monitor in order to
decide whether to give back or not the budget value to the requester.
 We then develop risk-aware group-based access control (RA-GBAC) based on previous
models in order to better support the management of permissions in collaborative environ-
ments in which groups of users collaborate to fulﬁl a common task. We introduce the task
as an entity that groups together all the permissions necessary for the whole time-period
needed to fulﬁl it. When a team gets the permission for fulﬁlling a task, all the members can
access to all the permission associated with the task for the whole time period. We adapt
the concept of mitigation strategy and risk assessment to be applied for the assignment of a
task to a group of users. We introduce the collective obligations as risk mitigation method
that have to be fulﬁlled by one of the member of the requesting team. Team members can
share their budget and use part of it for activating some tasks.
 We extend our XACML-aware architecture to encode the group model by introducing the
task and group entities. We adapt the deﬁnition of the risk-assessment procedure for the as-
signment of a task to a team. We introduce a budget-sharing mechanism and the monitoring
of collective obligations.
1.3 Thesis outline
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 Chapter 2: We present some background knowledges about RAAC and XACML. Speciﬁ-
cally, we introduce RAAC, and then we present in a formal way an abstract RAAC model
based on the one deﬁned by Chen et al. (2012). In this model we restrict the set of supported
risk mitigation methods only to system obligations. We do so in order to ﬁrstly provide a
simple implementation of this model that can be extended later to support additional fea-
tures. We then introduce the syntax and the main features of XACML policy language and
the reference architecture for the implementation of an XACML-based system.
 Chapter 3: We ﬁrstly provide an XACML implementation for the RAAC model presented
in chapter 2 showing how it can be used on top of the RB-XACML proﬁle. We extend the
XACML reference architecture and show a policy example in which we represent the risk
mitigation strategy for the activation of a permission. We then extend the RAAC model
instantiating the abstract model deﬁned by Chen et al. (2012). We introduce the support for
user obligations and the concept of budget and show how to extend the XACML implemen-
tation to support these new features.
 Chapter 4: We propose a risk-aware group-based access control (RA-GBAC) model. We ex-
tend the XACML implementation of Chapter 3 and show an example of policy that deﬁnes
a risk mitigation strategy for the activation of a task by a group. We discuss the implemen-
tation of a modular obligation monitor that support collective obligations.
 Chapter 5: We present an example based on an healthcare scenario to underline the motiva-
tion for the introduction of our RA-GBAC model. While discussing the example we make
some remarks on the possible coherent choices for a risk-mitigation strategy associated with
a task, the risk assessment algorithm and the budget sharing mechanism. We also discuss
the possibility to deﬁne some additional security constraints and risk thresholds.Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we give an overview of the background knowledge related to the focus of this
thesis. First, we introduce the risk-aware access control (RAAC) paradigm, how it works and
the motivations for its use. We then present the abstract model for RAAC proposed by Chen et al.
(2012) which underpins our work in the following chapters. After that we introduce the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) standard that will be used later to implement our
RAAC system.
2.1 RAAC
RAAC is a novel access control paradigm designed to enable optimal access to resources and
sharing of information in a dynamic or collaborative environment. The requirements for what
we refer as optimal access to resources are addressed by the principle of least privileges (Saltzer
and Schroeder, 1975). This principle states that a subject, at any time, must be allowed to access
only the information and resources that are necessary to fulﬁl his task. Access control systems are
usually implemented by an authorization decision function which, given an access request from a
user, returns a decision. Authorization decision functions are usually based on the access control
list mechanism in which every permission is associated with a list of access control entries, each
of which identiﬁes a subject and a set of access rights. This approach requires a prior deﬁnition of
policies that speciﬁes a set of authorised requests, but does not meet the requirements of dynamic
environments where the access needs are often unpredictable.
In a RAAC system the decisions are taken according to the result of a risk analysis by the
system for the given access request. In fact, the core goal of developing RAAC systems is to
provide a mechanism that can manage the trade-off between the risk of allowing unauthorized
access with the cost of denying access when the inability to access resources may have profound
consequences. This approach can be particularly useful, for example, to allow some risky access
in an emergency situation, when the risk incurred by allowing some access is considered accept-
able compared to the consequences of denying the access. Security systems based on RAAC are
generally considered to be more permissive as they allow some risky access that would be denied
by traditional access control systems.
The principal issues in developing a RAAC system are:
1. How to assess the risk of granting an access request; and
2. How to decide, given the risk value, whether to allow the risky access or to deny it.2.1. RAAC 14
When a risky access is allowed, the system could require a user, or the system itself to per-
form some action with the goal of accounting for and reducing the risk incurred by granting the
permission. We refer at these action as risk mitigation methods. In the case that these actions
can be performed by the system, we refer to them as system obligations. On the other hand, if
these actions have to be performed by the user we refer to them as user obligations. An exam-
ple system obligation could be logging requests for future review. User obligations can include
requiring the user to write a report in which he justiﬁes the requests, or to delete certain sensitive
data after use. While the access control system can guarantee that the system obligations will be
performed, a user could intentionally or unintentionally fail to fulﬁl his obligation. For this rea-
son access control systems often introduce some mechanism to encourage the users to fulﬁl their
obligations. In traditional access control system the returned decision usually can assume only the
values permit or deny. Since RAAC systems, with the introduction of risk mitigation methods,
can return richer type of decision response, they are considered more ﬂexible than the traditional
systems.
Chen et al. (2012) proposed an abstract model for RAAC deﬁning basic components of a
RAAC system that supports risk assessment, risk-aware authorisation decision making and the
use of system and user obligations as risk mitigation methods. In the next section we are going to
formally introduce a RAAC module based on their work that supports only system obligation as
risk mitigation methods and that will be extended in the next chapters to support some additional
features.
2.1.1 An abstract model for RAAC
Let P be a set of permissions. A permission represents an action-object pair for which a subject
may be authorised. Let S be a set of subjects. A subject represents an active entity in a system that
may request access to resources. LetC be a set of contexts. We model an access request as a tuple
hs;p;ci, where s 2 S, p 2 P and c 2C. In general, the risk of granting a permission to a subject
in a particular context can be interpreted as the likelihood of the permission being misused by
the subject. Determining the likelihood of misuse depends on various factors such as the security
attributes of the subject (e.g. trustworthiness, roles or access history), the value of the resource,
the context (e.g. device, location or current time) from which the subject is requesting access, etc.
Let S denote a set of states, and K = fk 2 R : 0 6 k 6 1g denote a risk domain. We deﬁne a risk
function Risk : QS ! K that takes as input an access request q = hs;p;ci 2 Q and the current
system state s 2 S, and returns the risk k 2 K associated with the request. There are a number
of ways of explicitly deﬁning the Risk function depending on system requirements and a concrete
access control model. These are domain-dependant, and thus outside the scope of this paper.
From the system’s perspective, we need to determine a risk threshold that the system is will-
ing to accept when granting access requests, and what kind of risk mitigation should be put in
place if risky access is allowed. We deﬁne risk thresholds and risk mitigation strategies on a
per-permission basis. We write [k;k0) to denote the risk interval fx 2 K : k 6 x < k0g. Let Os
denote a set of system obligations, where os 2 Os is some action that must be taken by the system
when enforcing an access control decision. Then we deﬁne a risk mitigation strategy to be a list
[hk0;Os
0i;hk1;Os
1i;:::;hkn 1;Os
n 1i;hkn;Os
ni], where 0 = k0 < k1 <  < kn 6 1 and Os
i  Os. Let
M denote a set of risk mitigation strategies. We deﬁne a function m : P ! M, where m(p) denotes2.2. XACML 15
the risk mitigation strategy associated with permission p. Informally, a risk mitigation strategy
m(p) for p 2 P speciﬁes that obligations Os
i will be executed if the risk of granting p is within
the interval [ki;ki+1). Note that a special case of our approach is to deﬁne a single risk mitigation
strategy that is applicable to all permissions, and this is the approach advocated in Cheng et al.
(2007) work.
Formally, given a request q = hs;p;ci and a system state s, we deﬁne an authorisation func-
tion Auth as,
Auth(q;s) =
8
<
:
hallow;Os
ii if Risk(q;s) 2 [ki;ki+1), 1 6 i < n;
hdeny;Os
ni otherwise:
In other words, the request hs;p;ci is permitted but the system must enforce obligations Os
i if the
risk of allowing hs;p;ci belongs to [ki;ki+1], and the request hs;p;ci is denied but the system must
perform Os
n if the risk is greater than or equal to kn.
We believe that these risk-based features can be naturally integrated into existing access con-
trol models, making them become risk-aware. In role-based access control, for example, we may
introduce risk assessment on user-role activation. In this case, a subject s 2 S is regarded as a
user or a session, and a permission p 2 P as an approval to activate a particular role. Of course,
there exist other possible interpretations of subjects and permissions for RBAC or other access
control models. In most cases, a permission is thought of as an approval to perform an operation
on a protected resource, and this is the notion deﬁned in the RBAC standard (American National
Standards Institute, 2004), whereas a subject could also be regarded as a role or even a security
group.
In order to illustrate the features of RAAC, we introduce a concrete example for accessing
patient records in an emergency situation. One evening, Alice is knocked unconscious in a car
accident and is taken into the emergency department by an ambulance. The emergency doctor
treating her, Bob, would like to view her summary care record (SCR) in order to ﬁnd out whether
there are any important factors to consider, such as any allergies to medications. However, Bob is
not allowed to access the SCR via the current activated Doctor role. In this case, Bob attempts to
activate EmergencyDoctor role, and the system determines whether to grant this request based
on risk assessment. The risk computation depends on two factors associated with the request:
the level of competence of Bob to activate this role, and the context (e.g. emergency situation)
in which the request was submitted. Eventually, the system deems the risk is acceptable and
allowsBobtoactivatetheEmergencyDoctorrole, therebyallowinghimtoaccessAlice’sSCR.
Meanwhile, all those activities are noted in an audit trail, and result in an alert being automatically
sent to a privacy ofﬁcer.
2.2 XACML
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is an OASIS standard that deﬁnes an
XML-based language for specifying access control policies, requests and responses. The stan-
dard also deﬁne a reference architecture for implementing an access control system based on this
language. The latest version XACML 3.0 (OASIS, 2013) was ratiﬁed by OASIS standards orga-
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Based Access Control). Decisions can be made according to some conditions on the attributes of
the subject, the object of the request or the system environment. This approach makes XACML
a ﬂexible authorization system that allows the speciﬁcation of context-aware and risk-intelligent
access control policies. The standard also deﬁnes a RBAC (Role Based Access Control) proﬁle
as a particular case of an ABAC system. Another important feature of XACML consists of the
capability of a policy to refer to some other policies, combining their results according to different
policy-combination-algorithms. This allows the implementation of distributed security systems in
which resources and policies can reside in different locations or organizations. The capability of
an XACML policy to refer to other policies also supports features like role hierarchy or the re-use
of the same policy for controlling access to different kinds of resources, avoiding inconsistencies
and eliminating duplications between policies.
XACML promotes the separation of the authorization decision point from the decision en-
forcement point. This separation makes it easier for a system administrator to manage access
control policies for the whole system. In fact the standard architecture offers authorization as a
service to the system. Every application just needs to query the XACML decision point to know
whether or not it is allowed to perform an action. There is therefore, no need to embed the access
control rules in the code of different applications. When a system administrator wants to change
some access control rules he will just need to adapt the related policy in the XACML authorization
system and this modiﬁcation will affect all the applications of the information system.
Here we describe the speciﬁcation for the reference architecture and the policy language
deﬁned in the version 3.0 of the XACML standard, that is the one used in our implementation.
2.2.1 Reference architecture
The reference XACML architecture proposed by OASIS is shown in the data-ﬂow diagram in
Figure 2.1. We now describe its main components referring to the typical data-ﬂow generated by
an access request in an XACML system.
 PDP (Policy Decision Point): receive access requests from the context handler (step 3) and
it queries the Policy Repository to ﬁnd the applicable policies for an access request (step 4).
This is done by evaluating the applicability conditions over the request context. Only one
applicable condition at a time can be found for every access request. If no, or more than one
applicable policy is found the PDP has to return a response containing an error code. When
it ﬁnds an applicable policy, the PDP has to evaluate its rules in the way that we will explain
later and returns the corresponding decision to the context handler (step 9). The evaluation
of the rules and the policy applicability conditions can require the PDP to retrieve some
additional attributes not speciﬁed in the request context. These attributes can be retrieved
by the context handler querying an apposite module called PIP (steps 5-8).
 PEP (Policy Enforcement Point): is an application-dependent component. The standard
states that it has to intercept every user access request (step 1), forward it to the context
handler (step 2) and enforce the authorization decision returned by the context handler (step
10). Enforcing the returned decision could involve the fulﬁlment of some system obliga-
tions returned in the response. In particular the speciﬁcation for the reference architecture
states that the returned decision can be enforced only if all the obligations can be correctly2.2. XACML 17
interpreted and fulﬁlled by the PEP. In case this is not possible the PEP shall return an er-
ror message. As shown in the data-ﬂow diagram (Figure 2.1) (OASIS, 2013) the system
obligation fulﬁlment is usually performed by a separate module of the PEP.
 Context handler: Receive the requests from the PEP in an application-dependent format
(step 2), convert them to an XACML request and forward them to the PDP adding the
request context information (step 3). It can be asked by the PDP to retrieve some additional
attribute from the PIP if these are needed to evaluate a particular policy or rule (steps 5-6-
7-8). During this process, the context handler may have to identify the particular entity to
which the attribute query refers. This information is usually included in the request context
as an identiﬁer attribute for the entity. The context handler is also responsible for receiving
the XACML response from the PDP, with system obligations, and to convert it to a format
understandable for the PEP before forwarding it (steps 9-10).
 PIP (Policy Information Point): Provides the PDP with all the information not available
in the request context that is needed in order to evaluate an access request (e.g. subject,
resource and environment attributes). It acts as an interface between the PDP and the Data
Source of the application. Since the data source interface can differ for every application,
this is also deﬁned as an implementation-dependent component. In fact the PIP may be part
of the application, such as a username/password ﬁle, or external to the application, such as
a SAML (OASIS, 2005c) attribute authority.
 Policy Repository or PAP (Policy Administration Point): It stores all the XACML policies.
It is queried by the PDP every time it has to ﬁnd an applicable policy for an XACML access
request or to ﬁnd a speciﬁc policy that has been referred by another one. An important
feature of a PAP is that it has to allow the deﬁnition of a subset of the policy set as top-level
policies. These are the only policies that directly applicable for evaluating a request. The
policies in the set of non-top-level policies can be used only if referred to by another one. It
is important to carefully deﬁne these two sets in a way that, for every possible request, only
one applicable top-level policy can be found in the PAP.
2.2.2 Policy language
We now describe the XACML language model for policies, request and responses. The policy
speciﬁcation language model is showed in Figure2.2 (OASIS, 2013). In XACML the atomic unit
of an access control policy set is a <Rule>. A XACML <Policy> may be composed of a
number of individual rules combined together according to a combining algorithm. In the same
way a <PolicySet> may be composed by a number of individual policies. Three top-level
policy elements are deﬁned:
 <Rule>: contains a boolean condition c. If c evaluates to true, the rule returns a speciﬁed
decision d 2 f“Deny”;“Permit”g. If the condition evaluates to false the rule returns Not
applicable. A rule cannot be used in isolation to determine an authorization decision,
but it is intended to exist only within a <Policy> element. The main components of a rule
are:2.2. XACML 18
Figure 2.1: XACML reference architecture
– A <Target>: a simple condition in which one or more attribute values match with a
predeﬁned value. It speciﬁes for which requests the rule applies. If it is not speciﬁed,
the target is the same as the one from the <Policy> element to which it belongs, if
this is present, otherwise it matches with every request. The target can only contain a
disjunctive sequence of <AnyOf> elements. Every <AnyOf> element can only con-
tain a conjunctive sequence of <AllOf> elements. Every <AllOf> element can only
contain a disjunctive sequence of <Match> elements. A <Match> element compares
an attribute value with an embedded value applying a speciﬁc match function. For the
rule element to be applicable to the decision request every <AnyOf> element has to
evaluate to true. For a <AnyOf> to evaluate to true, at least one of the contained
<AllOf> elements has to evaluate to true. For a <AllOf> element to evaluate to
true, every contained <Match> element has to evaluate to true.
– a <Condition>: a boolean expression that reﬁnes the applicability of the rules
beyond the predicates implied by its target. It allows the system administrator
to write boolean expressions that apply functions chosen from a standard set to
one or more attribute variables. A <Condition> element must contain one el-
ement of a type that extends the <Expression> type. The following elements
are subtypes of the <Expression> type: <Apply> and <Function> that ap-
ply a speciﬁed function to a number of members; <AttributeDesignator>
and <AttributeSelector> that allows the retrieval of the value of a named
attribute from the request context and from a given xml path respectively; the
<VariableReference> element that allows reference to a variable deﬁned using
the <VariableDefinition> which we will describe later.2.2. XACML 19
– An Effect attribute: the decision value d 2 f“Deny”;“Permit”g that has to be re-
turned if both the rule and target conditions evaluates to true. Note that, if the condition
or the target doesn’t apply the rule evaluation will return “Not applicable”.
– A set of <ObligationExpression> elements: that specify some system obli-
gation that has to be fulﬁlled by the PEP when the rule applies and the speci-
ﬁed effect is returned. All the elements of this set have to be enclosed between
the <ObligationExpressions> element. An obligation in XACML is rep-
resented as a set of attribute assignments. No semantics are deﬁned for the obli-
gation speciﬁcation, the standard just states that the PEP has to be able to inter-
pret the speciﬁed obligation. In Figure 2.3 we show an example system obligation
that obliges the PEP to send a conﬁrmation email to the user who obtained access
to a resource. The <ObligationExpression> element must contain a set of
<AttributeAssignmentExpression> each one assigns a value to a speciﬁed
AttributeId. The value is enclosed in the tag and has to be a subtype of the
<Expression> element type previously deﬁned.
– A set of <AdviceExpression> elements: that specify some system advices that
the PEP should fulﬁl when the rule applies and the speciﬁed effect is returned. They
have been introduced since the last version of the standard and they follow the syntax
deﬁned for the <ObligationExpression> element.
 <Policy>: contains a set of <Rule> elements and a speciﬁed procedure for combining
the results of their evaluation. It is the basic unit used in the policy speciﬁcation and so
it is intended to form the basis of an authorization decision. The main components of a
<Policy> are:
– A <Target>: deﬁned in the same way as the Rule’s <Target>.
– A set of <VariableDefinition> elements: these allow the policy writer to asso-
ciate a VariableId to a speciﬁc value. The value is enclosed in the tag and has to be
a subtype of the <Expression> element type previously deﬁned. These variables
can be referenced using the <VariableReference> throughout the whole policy
in the deﬁnition of rule’s condition, obligations or advice.
– A set of <Rule> elements.
– A rule-combining-algorithm attribute: it speciﬁes the algorithm used by the
PDP to combine the results of the different rule components. For example, in the
case that the speciﬁed combining algorithm is deny-override, and if at least one
<Rule> element which evaluates to deny is encountered, the returned decision will
be Deny, no matter what are the returned decisions of the other rules are. XACML
identiﬁes six combining algorithms, but also provides an extension point that allows
us to deﬁne new algorithms.
– A set of <ObligationExpression> elements: as speciﬁed for the <Rule> ele-
ment.
– A set of <AdviceExpression> elements: as speciﬁed for the <Rule> element.2.2. XACML 20
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Figure 2.2: XACML policy language model diagram
 <PolicySet>: contains a set of <Policy> or other <PolicySet> elements and a
speciﬁed procedure for combining the results of their evaluation. This is the standard means
for combining separate policies into a single combined policy. The main components of a
PolicySet are:
– A <Target>: as speciﬁed above.
– a set of <Policy> or <PolicySet> elements. An external
<PolicySet> or <Policy> can be referred by its id using respectively the
<PolicySetIdReference> and the <PolicyIdReference>
– A Policy-combining algorithm: specifying the algorithm used by the PDP
to combine the results of the different Policy components. These algorithms are de-
ﬁned in the same way as for the rule-combining-algorithms.
– A set of <ObligationExpression> elements: as speciﬁed above.
– A set of <AdviceExpression> elements: as speciﬁed above.
00 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="send-confirm-email" FulfillOn="Permit">
01 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="mail"
02 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
03 <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="subject-category:mail"
04 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
05 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="false" />
06 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
07 </ObligationExpression>
Figure 2.3: Obligation attribute deﬁnition in XACML 3.02.2. XACML 21
As we stated before, this hierarchical structure allows XACML to support distributed policy
systems, with some policies that could be stored and evaluated in different servers that could act
as distinct PDPs. The PDP server that receives an access request for some distribute resources will
have to ask the different servers to evaluate the request and then combine the decisions applying
the speciﬁed combining algorithm.
We mentioned before that one of the subtypes of the <Expression> element type is the
<AttributeDesignator> element. This tag is used to refer to an attribute value. An at-
tribute is identiﬁed both by an AttributeId and a Category. XACML deﬁnes three differ-
ent categories for variables of subjects, resources and actions of the access request and one for
environment variables (e.g. date, time). The context handler is responsible for returning to the
PDP the value associated with the variable, searching for it in the request context or querying the
PIP. From version 3.0 of XACML it is possible to deﬁne custom categories of attributes. These
new categories have to be supported by the application PIP. In Figure2.4 we show how to use the
<AttributeDesignator> element to retrieve the id value of the subject of the request. In
Line 01 and 02 we specify the id and the category of the attribute respectively. The attribute has to
be of one of the types supported by XACML, and this type has to be speciﬁed in the DataType
(Line 03).
00 <AttributeDesignator
01 AttributeId = "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
02 Category= "uurn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:subject"
03 DataType= "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
04 />
Figure 2.4: Example of attribute retrieval in XACML 3.0
An XACML request context is created by the context handler when it receives a request from
the PEP. It includes one or more sets of attribute elements, each of which is associated with one
of the supported attribute categories. In Figure2.5 we show an example of a request context. All
the attributes in the same category are enclosed in the same <Attributes> element and the
category id is speciﬁed with the Category element. An attribute assignment is deﬁned by the
<Attribute> element and with the id speciﬁed as an attribute and the value enclosed in an
<AttributeValue> element.
An XACML response context includes one or more results, each of which is comprised of a
decision and, optionally, obligations and advice. The decision may be to permit or deny access,
or to indicate that no policies or rules are applicable to the access request, or that some error has
occurred. In Figure 2.6 we show an example of response context. The decision Deny is speciﬁed
in Line 02. The <StatusCode> in Line 04 allows the speciﬁcation of whether an error occurred.
A free form message describing the status can be speciﬁed in the <StatusMessage> element.
From Line 08 to 15 we can see an example of a returned obligation that obliges the system to audit
the denied access request specifying as obligation attributes the subject and the resource of the
request.2.2. XACML 22
00 <Request ...>
01 <Attributes Category="...:subject-category:access-subject">
02 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
03 AttributeId="...:subject:subject-id">
04 <AttributeValue
05 DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name">
06 bs@simpsons.com</AttributeValue>
07 </Attribute>
08 </Attributes>
09 <Attributes Category="...:attribute-category:resource">
10 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
11 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id">
12 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">
13 file://example/med/record/patient/BartSimpson</AttributeValue>
14 </Attribute>
15 </Attributes>
16 <Attributes Category="...:attribute-category:action">
17 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
18 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id">
19 <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
20 read</AttributeValue>
21 </Attribute>
22 </Attributes>
23 </Request>
Figure 2.5: Example of request context in XACML 3.0
00 <Response ...>
01 <Result>
02 <Decision>Deny</Decision>
03 <Status>
04 <StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/>
05 <StatusMessage>permission denied</StatusMessage>
06 </Status>
07 <Obligations>
08 <Obligation FulfillOn="Permit" ObligationId="audit-request">
09 <AttributeAssignment DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
10 AttributeId="subject">Admin
11 </AttributeAssignment>
12 <AttributeAssignment DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
13 AttributeId="resource">readme.txt
14 </AttributeAssignment>
15 </Obligation>
16 </Obligations>
17 </Result>
18 </Response>
Figure 2.6: Example of response context in XACML 3.0Chapter 3
The XACML RAAC Implementation
As we described in Section 2.1, RAAC is a novel paradigm that allows an access control system
to take a decision on an access request according to the result of a risk analysis that considers
the various elements of the access request (user, resource) and the state of the system itself. This
approach leads to a more ﬂexible access control system able to deal with the increasing needs to
exchange information and enable the access to permission in a dynamic environment.
XACML (introduced in Section 2.2) is a standard access control policy language that, in
the last years, has attracted a lot of interest from the research community and some IT vendors
because of its ﬂexibility and of its architecture, compliant with the standard authorization service
architecture (ISO 10181, 1996) that promotes the separation of the authorization decision point
from the decision enforcement point. Our goal is to provide an XACML implementation of a
RAAC model which illustrates a ﬂexible way to make many existing system become risk aware
only with minor changes in the architecture of the XACML authorization system. This is due to
the hierarchical structure of the XACML policy language that allows reference from a top-level
policy to other policies and use their returned decisions as partial results for its evaluation.
The XACML standard speciﬁcation deﬁnes some proﬁles for implementing common features
ofaccesscontrolsystems, suchasarolebasedaccesscontrol(RBAC)proﬁle, hierarchicalresource
proﬁle, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) proﬁle, etc. There are no standard proﬁles
for risk-aware access control implementations yet and we are not aware of any other open-source
XACMLpolicymodelthatsupportrisk-awarefeatures. ForthesereasonsweproposeourXACML
implementation of an RAAC system based on the abstract model previously deﬁned. As stated
before, our purpose is to deﬁne a generic XACML model that can be used in combination with
any existing implementation to make it become risk-aware. Additionally, RBAC is one of the
most widely used access control models in practice. For ease of illustration, in this chapter, we
introduce our approach to implementing RAAC based on the standard RBAC XACML proﬁle.
In particular, our approach proposes the risk mitigation strategy to be associated with user-role
activation, which embodies a natural way to make the XACML RBAC proﬁle become risk-aware.
One of the main issues in developing a XACML-based RAAC model is due to the fact that
the risk assessment is a dynamic procedure. The risk is in fact not a static attribute of an entity, but
it can depend on the attributes of the particular request and on the status of the system when the
request is received. In the following sections we will show how it is possible, using only standard
features of the XACML language, and introducing only minor improvements in the implementa-
tion of some of the modules of the XACML reference architecture. Additionally, we show how3.1. RBAC AND ITS XACML PROFILE 24
we can write risk mitigation policies that can be referenced many times in the deﬁnition of per-
mission policies. From Section 3.4.1 we introduce an open source implementation of the XACML
3.0 architecture called “Balana” and show how it can be extended for supporting dynamic risk
calculation and the deﬁnition of our risk mitigation strategies.
3.1 RBAC and its XACML proﬁle
Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control model that attracted a lot of interest from
the research community in the last decades. The basic idea of RBAC is to introduce the concept
of a role, which acts as a “bridge” between users and permissions. More speciﬁcally, system
administrators can create roles according to the job functions performed in an organization, and
then assign users to roles on the basis of their speciﬁc job responsibilities. Every role can then
be assigned to a set of permissions that are necessary to perform work-related activities. This
feature of a role-based model greatly simpliﬁes the management of permissions in an organization.
For example, by simply changing the set of permissions associated with a role we change the
permissions set for all the users empowering that role. Moreover when a new user joins a company,
we can just add him to the lists of users empowering a few roles associated to his job-functions
without needing to specify every single permission that he needs. The RBAC96 family of models
is undoubtedly the most well known model for RBAC (Sandhu et al., 1996), and provides the basis
for the recent ANSI RBAC standard (American National Standards Institute, 2004). It introduces
support for role hierarchy and additional constraints between roles, allowing the implementation
of, for example, the Separation of Duty (SOD) principle.
The XACML speciﬁcation deﬁnes the XACML RBAC proﬁle (RB-XACML). The ver-
sion 3.0 of RB-XACML was approved in August 2010 (OASIS, 2010). It doesn’t introduce
any new functionality, in fact it only updates the RB-XACML 2.0 (OASIS, 2005a) to comply
with the XACML 3.0 speciﬁcation. It is designed to address the core and hierarchy compo-
nents of RBAC. It describes how to write a <PolicySet> for the deﬁnition of permission
and role assignment. A Role <PolicySet> (RPS) associates a role identiﬁer with a single
permission <PolicySet> (PPS) referencing to it with <PolicySetIdReference> ele-
ment. The target of an RPS limits the applicability of the <PolicySet> to subjects hold-
ing the associated role attribute and value. The PPS contains the actual permissions for a
given role. It contains <Policy> and <Rule> elements that deﬁne which resources and un-
der which conditions can be accessed by the users empowering the given role. A given PPS
can also refer to other PPS from a junior role using the <PolicySetIdReference> ele-
ment, allowing the given role to inherit all the permission of the junior role. Since a given PPS
can be referenced not only by different RPS, associated with different roles, the target of the
PPS doesn’t have to restrict the role of the request’s subject. Figure 3.1 shows pseudo Role
<PolicySet> and Permission <PolicySet> that implement the emergence example de-
scribed in Section 2.1.1. The EmergencyDoctor’s Role <PolicySet> (lines 01-04) con-
sists of a <Target> element (line 02) and a <PolicySetIdRef> element (line 03). The
<Target> only matches users who are permitted to enable the EmergencyDoctor role at-
tribute. The <PolicySetIdRef> points to a Permission <PolicySet> (lines 07-14) associ-
ated with the EmergencyDoctor role, which implements permissions-role assignment for that3.2. DEFINING THE RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY 25
role. The Permission <PolicySet> of the EmergencyDoctor role contains a <Policy>
(lines 08-12) and a <PolicySetIdRef> (line 13) elements. The <Policy> speciﬁes a per-
mission for reading Alice’s summary care record. The <PolicySetIdRef> points to the Per-
mission <PolicySet> associated with the normal Doctor role. This has the effect of making
the permissions of the Doctor role available to the EmergencyDoctor role, thereby imple-
menting role inheritance.
00 <!-- Role <PolicySet> -->
01 <PolicySet ... PolicySetId="RPS:emergencydoctor:role"...>
02 <Target>Any user with "EmergencyDoctor" attribute</Target>
03 <PolicySetIdRef>PPS:emergencydoctor:role</PolicySetIdRef>
04 </PolicySet>
05
06 <!-- Permission Set -->
07 <PolicySet ... PolicySetId="PPS:emergencydoctor:role"...>
08 <Policy ... PolicySetId="PP:scr:read"...>
09 <Rule RuleId="scr:read" Effect="Permit">
10 <Target>read Alice’s SCR</Target>
11 </Rule>
12 </policy>
13 <PolicySetIdRef>PPS:doctor:role</PolicySetIdRef>
14 </PolicySet>
Figure 3.1: Role <PolicySet> and Permission <PolicySet> in RB-XACML
RB-XACML states that “a role attribute for a given user is a valid assignment at the time the
access decision is requested, and the assignment of role attributes to users... is outside the scope
of the XACML PDP” (OASIS, 2010). The standard speciﬁcation suggests the use of an external
role enabling authority (REAs) to determine the values of a user’s role attributes. How the REA
should work is not speciﬁed but, one possible suggestion is that it could act as a separate PDP
using the set of role assignment <PolicySet> to determine whether a user can be assigned to a
particular role. A role assignment <PolicySet> deﬁnes which roles can be enabled or assigned
to which subjects. It may also specify restrictions on the combination or number of roles that can
be enabled for a given subject.
In order to comply with RB-XACML, we believe that it is most natural to deﬁne risk as-
sessment and risk mitigation in conjunction with Role Assignment <PolicySet> to implement
risk-aware RBAC using XACML. This is also consistent with the way of deﬁning risk mitigation
strategies in the abstract RAAC model, where each resource is associated with a risk mitigation
strategy, and the resource is considered as a permission to enable a role attribute for users in
this case. Figure 3.2 shows a fragment of a Role Assignment <PolicySet> that comprises a
<Target> element (lines 02-06) and a <PolicyIdRef> element (line 07). The <Target>
determines the <PolicySet> and is only applicable to subjects who has a particular attribute
(their email name is in the “nhs.com” namespace). It also restricts the resource and action at-
tributes in the request to be EmergencyDoctor role and EnableRole respectively. The
<PolicyIdRef> points to a Risk Mitigation <Policy> that further prevents subjects from
enabling the EmergencyDoctor by assessing the risk of their requests.
3.2 Deﬁning the risk mitigation strategy
We deﬁne a risk mitigation strategy in a Risk Mitigation <Policy> that is treated as a ﬁrst-class
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00 <!-- Role Assignment <PolicySet> -->
01 <PolicySet PolicySetId="emergencydoctor:role:requirements"...>
02 <Target>
03 <AnyOf><AllOf><Match>has email address *@nhs.com</Match></AllOf></AnyOf>
04 <AnyOf><AllOf><Match>EmergencyDoctor</Match></AllOf></AnyOf>
05 <AnyOf><AllOf><Match>EnableRole</Match></AllOf></AnyOf>
06 </Target>
07 <PolicyIdRef>rm:emergencydoctor:audit</PolicyIdRef>
08 </PolicySet>
Figure 3.2: Role Assignment <PolicySet>
<PolicySet> simply by referencing it with a <PolicySetIdReference> without need to
re-write it. Figure 3.3 shows fragments of a Risk Mitigation <Policy> for the emergence exam-
ple. This <Policy> consists of a <VariableDefinition> element and two <Rule> ele-
ments. Note that the <Target> element in this <Policy> is omitted, in which case it is implied
by the <Target> of the Role Assignment <PolicySet>. The <VariableDefinition>
(lines 02-04) is used to deﬁne a risk threshold for the mitigation strategy, which achieves split-
ting the risk domain [0;1] into two risk intervals [0;0:7) and [0:7;1]. Clearly, we can deﬁne an
arbitrary number of such <VariableDefinition> elements (risk thresholds) to have a more
ﬁne-grained risk intervals. Specifying the risk thresholds in these variables instead of hard-coding
them in the rule conditions provides a ﬂexible way to update and maintain the risk mitigation pol-
icy. Speciﬁcally, a policy administrator only needs to change those variable deﬁnitions in order to
change the risk thresholds for existing risk intervals.
Now it becomes very natural to write different rules that refer to these variables to imple-
ment a risk mitigation strategy. The ﬁrst <Rule> (lines 05-21) has Permit as its effect when
the condition is satisﬁed (lines 06-19); that is, the risk value for the access request lies in the
interval [0;0:7). Note that the <AttributeDesignator> element is used to retrieve a risk
value for the access request, and the returned value must meet the speciﬁed criteria such as un-
der the access-risk category and issued by a trusted authority (line 09). We describe how
this mechanism works in the next section. Similarly, the second <Rule> (lines 22-28) has
Deny as its effect if the risk value lies in the interval [0;7;1]. Additionally, both rules contain
<ObligationExpression> (line 20 and line 27) which are evaluated into obligations by the
PDP.
It can be seen that we deﬁne two or more <Rule>s in the Risk Mitigation <Policy>, each
of which corresponds to checking a risk interval. For the sake of readability, we arrange these rules
in an order with respect to the risk intervals from low to high ([0;0:7) to [0:7;1] in Figure 3.3, for
example). This naturally leads us to use the first-applicable algorithm (OASIS, 2013,
Appendix C) for combining the results of rules in the Risk Mitigation <Policy>. This algorithm
forces the evaluation of the rules in the order listed in the policy, and ensures that for a particular
rule, if its target and condition evaluates to True, then the result for the policy is the effect of the
rule (Permit or Deny). In Figure 3.3, for example, if the <Rule> in lines 05-21 evaluates to
Permit, then the second <Rule> is not evaluated, and a value of Permit is returned for the
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00 <!-- Risk Mitigation <Policy> -->
01 <Policy PolicyId="rm:emergencydoctor:audit" RuleCombiningAlgId="first-applicable">
02 <VariableDefinition VariableId="first-risk-threshold">
03 <AttributeValue>0.7</AttributeValue>
04 </VariableDefinition>
05 <Rule RuleId="first-risk-interval-check" Effect="Permit">
06 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
07 <Apply FunctionId="double-greater-than-or-equal">
08 <Apply FunctionId="function:double-one-and-only">
09 <AttributeDesignator Category="access-risk" AttributeId="risk" Issuer="TA"/>
10 </Apply>
11 <AttibuteValue>0</AttributeValue>
12 </Apply>
13 <Apply FunctionId="function:double-less-than">
14 <Apply FunctionId="function:double-one-and-only">
15 <AttributeDesignator Category="access-risk" AttributeId="risk" Issuer="TA"/>
16 </Apply>
17 <VariableReference VariableId="first-risk-threshold"/></VariableReference>
18 </Apply>
19 </Apply></Condition>
20 <ObligationExpressions>Log and Alert</ObligationExpressions>
21 </Rule>
22 <Rule RuleId="second-risk-interval-check" Effect="Deny">
23 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="double-greater-than-or-equal">
24 <Apply FunctionId="function:double-one-and-only">
25 <AttributeDesignator Category="access-risk" AttributeId="risk" Issuer="TA"/>
26 </Apply>
27 <VariableReference VariableId="first-risk-interval-check"></Apply></Condition>
28 <ObligationExpressions>Log</ObligationExpressions>
29 </Rule>
30 </Policy>
Figure 3.3: Risk Mitigation <Policy>
3.3 Risk assessment
Recall that, given an access request, a Role Assignment <PolicySet> is evaluated to Permit
for the request only if the conditions deﬁned in its target are met by the request and its associated
Risk Mitigation <Policy> evaluates to Permit (which means the risk of granting this request
lies in an acceptable risk interval). Let us now look at how to use XACML to compute the risk
associated with an access request in more detail. As we mentioned while deﬁning our abstract
model, incurred by granting a request from a subject to access a resource could depends on various
factors such as:
 The history of the subject requesting access, comprising previously authorised access re-
quests and prior fulﬁllment of obligations;
 The relationship between the requesting subject and the resource (e.g. a doctor-patient as-
signment);
 The position of the subject in an organizational hierarchy (corresponding to the notion of
role in an RBAC system);
 The purpose for subject’s access request (operational need). In particular we could have to
take into account also the risk derived from denying the access request; and
 The threat level of the environment in which the request was submitted...
Since XACML itself supports the use of attributes when constructing request contexts and
policies, it would be natural to express these factors as attributes and choose a suitable XACML3.4. A JAVA IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR RA-XACML MODEL 28
functions to combine these attributes into a risk value in the rule condition. As a generic solution,
However, the XACML predeﬁned functions are limited; it is also not clear whether XACML
accommodates the deﬁnition of an arbitrary new function, such as the complex formula used to
compute risk in a multi-level security model (Cheng et al., 2007).
Insteadweproposeamethodinwhichtheriskcalculationisconductedbyadedicatedmodule
of the PIP. As shown in the previous section, we introduce a special attribute, namely risk, under
the access-risk category and require that the values for this attribute are issued by a special
trusted authority. When evaluating the Risk Mitigation <Policy>, the PDP is instructed to
request values for this risk attribute in the request context from the context hander. The context
handler may retrieve this risk values from the PIP and then supply the required values into the
request context. This suggests that the PIP should be able to compute the risk value at run-time
when requested by the context harder, and this is compliant with the requirement of RAAC on the
dynamic risk analysis.
3.4 A Java implementation of our RA-XACML model
We decided to explore the approach just deﬁned by implementing a Java application for our med-
ical emergency example introduced in Section 2.1.1. In the next sections we introduce Balana,
an open-source implementation of the XACML reference architecture written in Java and we ex-
plain how we can write an improved PIP that supports the dynamic risk calculation for an access
request.
3.4.1 Balana XACML 3.0 implementation
After the speciﬁcation of the 2.0 version of the standard, Sun (now Oracle) has published an
open source implementation of the XACML architecture that supports versions 1.1 and 2.0. This
implementation is written in Java, an object oriented programming language developed by Sun
itself. It is called SunXACML and its source code is available for download at the address
http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/. So far Oracle hasn’t published any XACML im-
plementation compliant with version 3.0 of the standard. More recently WSO2, an open-source
software development company, has developed a new XACML engine based on the SunXACML
implementation that provide supports for the new version of the standard. This implementation
is called Balana and the source code of this implementation is available, together with some doc-
umentation and a tutorial at: http://xacmlinfo.com. It is still under development and a
stable version of the software has not yet been released. To implement our system it would be
useful to take advantage of the new features available in the version 3.0, especially of the capa-
bility to use variables in the obligation’s attribute speciﬁcation and to deﬁne new categories of
attributes. For these reasons, after some tests and some minor bug-ﬁxing we decided to use the
Balana implementation that seems to be stable enough for our purpose.
WSO2 Balana provides an implementation of a standard PDP compatible with XACML 1.0,
1.1, 2.0 and 3.0 speciﬁcations and some interfaces to allow developers to write their own PIP and
Policy repository modules. A developer who wants to build a system based on this implementation
has to write the code for these modules, implementing the related interfaces deﬁned in the Balana
package:
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is not present in the request context, there has to be one PIP module that allows the retrieval
of the associated value. These modules must extend the AttributeFinderModule
abstract class (Figure 3.4). The methods deﬁned in Lines 01 and 04 return a boolean
value that has to be true only if the module supports the retrieval of attributes using
the <AttributeDesignator> and <AttributeSelector> modules. The method
getSupportedCategories deﬁned in Line 10 returns the set of String identiﬁers for
the categories supported by the module while the method getSupportedIds in Line 13
returns the set of String identiﬁers for the attributes supported by the module. The two meth-
ods in Lines 16 and 20 are the core components of the module and are used by the PIP when
it needs to retrieve an attribute value. The ﬁrst of these two methods is used when the PDP
has to evaluate an <AttributeDesignator> element while the second is used when
evaluating an <AttributeSelector> element. Both the methods receive the request
context as a parameter so they can retrieve the information necessary to identify to which
particular instance the attribute request refers. For example, if the PDP needs to retrieve the
email address of the subject of the request, the PIP will have to retrieve, from the request
context, an identiﬁer for the user who is requesting access. Once we have instantiated an
object of a class that extends this abstract class we can load these modules into an object of
the AttributeFinder class and pass this object as a parameter during the instantiation
of a PDP class.
 At least a Policy ﬁnder module. These are modules that allows the system to search for a
speciﬁc policy in a policy repository. The PDP could perform queries to the repository in
two different ways:
1. Searching for Policy/PolicySet that is applicable for a particular request, or
2. Searching by its ID for a Policy/PolicySet that has been referred by another applicable
policy.
More modules can be loaded in the same policy ﬁnder, but while writing these modules and
the correspondent policy set the developer must make sure that at least one but not more
than one applicable policy will be found for every possible request. Every PolicyFinder
module has to extend the PolicyFinderModule abstract class (Figure 3.5). The two methods
isRequestSupported (Line 04) and isIdReferenceSupported (Line 07) return
a boolean value that is used by the PAP to check whether a module can be used to search
for a policy that matches a particular request or for a policy referred to by its id. The two
findPolicy (Lines 13 and 16) methods are used to search for a policy in the two ways
mentioned above.
3.4.2 Implementing the risk assessment module
Since the Balana implementation of the PIP is already structured in a modular way, it is straight-
forward for us to write a class called RiskAssessmentModule that extends the abstract class
AttributeFinderModule and supports the attribute category risk-category and the at-
tribute id risk-value. We are only interested in supporting the <AttributeDesignator>
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00 public abstract class AttributeFinderModule f
01 public String getIdentifier() f
02 return getClass().getName();
03 g
04 public boolean isDesignatorSupported() f
05 return false;
06 g
07 public boolean isSelectorSupported() f
08 return false;
09 g
10 public Set<String> getSupportedCategories() f
11 return null;
12 g
13 public Set getSupportedIds() f
14 return null;
15 g
16 public EvaluationResult findAttribute(URI attributeType, URI attributeId,
17 String issuer, URI category, EvaluationCtx context) f
18 return new EvaluationResult(BagAttribute.createEmptyBag(attributeType));
19 g
20 public EvaluationResult findAttribute(String contextPath, URI attributeType,
21 String contextSelector, Node root,
22 EvaluationCtx context, String xpathVersion) f
23 return new EvaluationResult(BagAttribute.createEmptyBag(attributeType));
24 g
25 g
Figure 3.4: AttributeFinderModule
00 public abstract class PolicyFinderModule f
01 public String getIdentifier() f
02 return getClass().getName();
03 g
04 public boolean isRequestSupported() f
05 return false;
06 g
07 public boolean isIdReferenceSupported() f
08 return false;
09 g
10 public abstract void init(PolicyFinder finder);
11 public void invalidateCache() f g
12
13 public PolicyFinderResult findPolicy(EvaluationCtx context) f
14 return new PolicyFinderResult();
15 g
16 public PolicyFinderResult findPolicy(URI idReference, int type,
17 VersionConstraints constraints, PolicyMetaData parentMetaData) f
18 return new PolicyFinderResult();
19 g
20 g
Figure 3.5: PolicyFinderModule
implement the findPolicy method in a generic way, allowing a developer who is using our ar-
chitecture to easily change the risk-calculation procedure without having to know how the Balana
implementation works. To do so we deﬁne a RiskCalculator interface as showed in Figure 3.6.
00 public interface RiskCalculator f
01 double calculateRisk(String subjectId,String permissionId );
02 g
Figure 3.6: RiskCalculator Interface
The only method deﬁned in this interface takes as a parameter two identiﬁers for subject and3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL AND ITS XACML IMPLEMENTATION 31
permissionandreturnsthevalueoftheriskassociatedwiththerequest. Whenusingourimplemen-
tation, a developer has to specify as a parameter an instance of this interface. Our findPolicy
method of the RiskAssessmentModule will have to retrieve all the identiﬁers about subject
and permission from the request context and return the result of the calculateRisk method.
Figure 3.7: The XACML architecture with risk assessment module
In Figure 3.7 we show the architecture of our XACML-based RAAC implementation. The
PIP that we implemented for our example scenario contains three modules for the retrieval of at-
tributes of the permission, subject and environment categories. Inside the PIP we also deﬁned the
RiskAssessment module that refers to a RiskCalculator interface for the dynamic calculation
of risk. In doing so, we are able to make our XACML policies become risk-aware without signif-
icant changes in the reference XACML architecture. In fact, the risk calculation is seen from the
PDP as a normal attribute retrieval and we can write policies in which the decision about an access
request is based on the actual value of the risk. The way in which the risk value is calculated
depends on the particular implementation of RiskCalculator interface.
3.5 Extending the model and its XACML implementation
3.5.1 Supporting user obligations
Recall that in a RAAC system, after granting a risky access, it could be useful to apply some risk
mitigation methods in order to reduce and account for the risk to which the system is exposed
and that one of the most common forms of risk mitigation methods, to which we refer as user
obligations, consists in obliging a subject to perform some kind of actions. Unlike system obli-
gations, user obligations may go unfulﬁlled, simply because the user has either deliberately failed
or forgotten to take obliged actions. Thus the system needs to deﬁne a mechanism that provide
incentives for users to fulﬁl their obligations and punishments for those who fail or refuse to do so.
In the next section we introduce an extended model based on the meta-model deﬁned in Section
2.1.1 in which we introduce support for the deﬁnition of user obligations in our risk mitigation
strategies. This extended model is based on the work by Chen et al. (2012) and it represents an
instantiation of the abstract RAAC model deﬁned there, in which we introduce only some minor3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL AND ITS XACML IMPLEMENTATION 32
changes. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne, for every user, a value called budget that represents, at any time,
the likelihood and the capability of the given user to fulﬁl his obligations. For every user, the bud-
get value will be updated according to the state of the current and previous obligations assigned
to him. The decision whether or not to allow a risky access for a subject, will depend not only on
the risk value associated with the request, but also on the budget value of the user. We then show
how we can extend the implementation deﬁned in Section 3.4.2 to support our extended module,
introducing the deﬁnition of user obligations and budget value in the risk mitigation policies. At an
enforcement level, the system has to be able to monitor the state of user obligations and undertake
appropriate actions in case of failure to fulﬁl them.
3.5.2 Formal model
Formally, we deﬁne a function b : S ! [0;1], where b(s) denotes the amount of budget for subject
s. The budget of s is used to pay deposits for granting risky accesses, and these deposits will
only be returned if s fulﬁls obligations resulting from her granted accesses. We model a user
obligation ou as a pair hA;li, where A is a set of actions and l is a symbolic temporal interval
(for example, Instantly, 10Hours) during which A must be performed. We write ? to denote the
“null” obligation; the requesting user or PEP is not required to do anything for the null obligation.
We also write d 2 [0;1] to denote an amount of deposit that the requesting user is required to
pay for some risky access to be granted. Then we extend a risk mitigation strategy to be a list
[hk0;os
0;?;0i;hk1;os
1;ou
1;d1i;:::;hkn 1;os
n 1;ou
n 1;dn 1i;hkn;os
n;?;0i], where 0 = k0 < k1 <  <
kn 6 1, os
i 2 Os, ou
i 2 Ou and 0 6 d1 <  < dn 1 6 1. Given a request q = hs;r;ci and a system
state s, we deﬁne an extended authorisation function Authe as,
Authe(q;s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
hallow;os
0;?;0i if Risk(q;s) < k1;
Bud(q;os
i;ou
i ;di) if Risk(q;s) 2 [ki;ki+1), 1 6 i < n;
hdeny;os
n;?;0i otherwise;
where the budget checker function Bud is deﬁned as,
Bud(q;os
i;ou
i ;di) =
8
<
:
hallow;os
i;ou
i ;dii if b(u) > di;
hdeny;os
i;?;dii otherwise:
Informally, the semantics for how Authe works is very close to Auth as we explained in
Sect 2.1.1, so we omit its explanation here. However, it would be important to see the basic ideas
behind the Bud function. Essentially, specifying deposits in a risk mitigation strategy provides a
means of sanctioning subjects, as well as restricting the number of risky accesses to be granted to
subjects. Speciﬁcally, if subject s has sufﬁcient budget to pay deposit di, then di will be deduced
from s’s budget when u accepts ou
i and di is returned when ou
i is fulﬁlled. If s’s budget is less than
the required deposit di because of failures to fulﬁl prior obligations, or the outstanding obligations
to be fulﬁlled, then s is denied access to resource, even though the risk of allowing the access
would be acceptable.
There are a few operations that the PEP is required to execute when receiving a response from
the Authe function. In fact, given a request hs;r;ci, the actions that the PEP has to perform vary3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL AND ITS XACML IMPLEMENTATION 33
depending on one of four possible results (shown below) being returned.
 hallow;os
i;?;0i and hdeny;os
i;?;0i: The PEP is required to perform system obligation os
i in
conjunction with enforcing an authorisation decision (either “allow” or “deny”).
 hallow;os
i;ou
i ;dii: In addition to enforcing the “allow” decision and executing os
i, when s ac-
cepts ou
i , the PEP would be able to transform ou
i into a more concrete form whose execution
the system can monitor. At the same time, the PEP needs to deduct the deposit di from s’s
budget and return it when ou
i is fulﬁlled.
 hdeny;os
i;?;dii: In addition to enforcing the “deny” decision and executing os
i, the PEP
needs to show a message dictating that s’s budget is not sufﬁcient to pay deposit di for
gaining this access. This is to inform s to seek a way to increase her budget, since the risk
of allowing her to access r is acceptable.
In the next section, we illustrate how to extend the XACML architecture to support these opera-
tional semantics of PEP.
3.5.3 XACML implementation
To implement the extended model using XACML, we ﬁrst look at how to extend the Risk Mitiga-
tion <Policy> to include the concept of budget. We consider the example scenario introduced
above and deﬁne a risk mitigation strategy for the permission to read Alice’s SCR. After that we
show how to write a risk mitigation <Policy> that implements this mitigation strategy explain-
ing which improvements have to be introduced, with respect to the XACML architecture deﬁned
in 3.4.2 to support the additional features of our model.
The risk mitigation strategy for the permission to read Alice’s SCR is represented in Figure
3.8. The horizontal bar represents the different risk-value ranges. When the risk-value lies in the
white area (below 0.2) the access is allowed without any requirement for the budget value and any
returned obligation. When it lies in the grey area, between 0.2 and 0.7, a budget of 0.3 is required
and the user is obliged to send an email to justify the access within one day and two hours from
the time when the request has been accepted. When the risk value is above 0.7 (black area) the
access request is always denied, no matter how high is the budget value of the subject.
Recall that the Risk Mitigation <Policy> includes <Rule>s, each of which is used to
check whether the risk lies in a speciﬁc interval. For some rules that have a <Permit> effect
(which means the risk is acceptable), we now need to further split each of them into two cases:
whether the requesting subject has sufﬁcient budget or not. In order to provide greater ﬂexibility
and economy in writing such complex rules, we take an approach that, for every risk interval, two
boolean variables are deﬁned: one, called risk-check, will be evaluated to true when the risk-value
lies in the given interval, the other, called budget-check, will be evaluated to true when the budget
value of a user is above the the budget threshold deﬁned for that interval. These boolean variables
can be referenced many times when deﬁning rules.
The risk mitigation <Policy> that implements the risk mitigation strategy associated to
the permission to read Alice SCR is showed in Figure 3.9. The <VariableDefinition>s
(lines 01-02) deﬁne the two risk thresholds that form three risk intervals: [0;0:2),[0:2;0:7) and
[0:7;1]. The<VariableDefinition>(line03)introducesabudgetvalue0:3thatcorresponds3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL AND ITS XACML IMPLEMENTATION 34
Figure 3.8: Risk mitigation strategy for permission to read Alice’s SCR
to the risk interval [0:2;0:7). In the extended model, there is no budget associated with the least
and most risky intervals ([0;0:2) and [0:7;1), for example), hence we simply omit them here.
The <VariableDefinition>s (lines 04-25) deﬁne three boolean variables, each of which
holds a True value if the risk value for the request lies in the corresponding interval and False
otherwise. Similarly, the boolean value in the <VariableDefinition> (line 26) indicates
whether the requesting subject’s budget is greater than 0:3. The budget of the subject is treated
as an attribute, and its value is retrieved by the means of <AttributeDesignator> with
the access-subject category deﬁned in the policy. The policy consists of four rules, each
of which just simply include one reference to the correspondent risk-check variable and one to
the budget-check variable. For example, the second rule (lines 30-49) is applicable (evaluates to
Permit) if its referred two <VariableDefinition> elements (lines 24-26) are both True.
XACMLallowsevery<Rule>toincludeasetof<ObligationExpression>elements,
each of which represents an obligation. An <ObligationExpression> can include an ar-
bitrary number of attribute assignments, which forms the arguments of the action deﬁned by the
obligation. For example, the obligation expression with user:email id (lines 39-49) deﬁnes
three attributes: the ﬁrst attribute (lines 40-42) speciﬁes who is obliged to fulﬁl the obligation; the
second(lines43-45)indicatestheemailaddressoftherequester’slinemanager; andthethird(lines
26-28) deﬁnes the temporal interval (1 day and 2 hours) during which the requester has to perform
the obligation. Note that the <ObligationId> attribute (line 19) identiﬁes the action; that
is, oblige the requester to send an email. When evaluating this <ObligationExpression>,
the PDP determines the values for <requester> and <emailID> at runtime by the means of
an <AttributeDesignator>, and sends the resulting obligation to the PEP in the response
context. XACML speciﬁcation states that the <ObligationExpression> element is used to
specify obligations that have to be fulﬁlled by the PEP. As stated in the XACML speciﬁcation, the
PEP itself has to understand and know how to handle the obligation when receiving the response.
Since the PEP is application dependent we are free to deﬁne our own syntax and semantics for an
obligation deﬁnition. To this end, we simply distinguish between a system obligation and a user3.5. EXTENDING THE MODEL AND ITS XACML IMPLEMENTATION 35
00 <Policy PolicyId="crm:emergencydoctor" RuleCombiningAlgId="first-applicable">
01 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-threshold-1">0.2</VariableDefinition>
02 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-threshold-2">0.7</VariableDefinition>
03 <VariableDefinition VariableId="budget-threshold-1">0.3</VariableDefinition>
04 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-1">
05 <Apply functionId=":1.0:function:and">
06 <Apply FunctionId="double-greater-than-or-equal">
07 <Apply FunctionId="double-one-and-only">
08 <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
09 Category="risk"
10 AttributeId="risk-value"
11 DataType="double" />
12 </Apply>
13 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-0"></VariableReference>
14 </Apply>
15 <Apply FunctionId=":1.0:function:double-less-than">
16 <Apply FunctionId=":1.0:function:double-one-and-only">
17 <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
18 Category="risk"
19 AttributeId="risk-value" DataType="double"/>
20 </Apply>
21 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-1"></VariableReference>
22 </Apply></Apply>
23 </VariableDefinition>
24 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-2">?(0.2<=risk<0.7)</VariableDefinition>
25 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-3">?(0.7<=risk<=1)</VariableDefinition>
26 <VariableDefinition VariableId="budget-check-1">?(budget>=0.3)</VariableDefinition>
27 <Rule RuleId="first-risk-interval" Effect="Permit">
28 <Condition><VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-1"></Condition>
29 </Rule>
30 <Rule RuleId="second-risk-interval-suffbudget" Effect="Permit">
31 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
32 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-2"></VariableReference>
33 <VariableReference VariableId="budget-check-1"></VariableReference>
34 </Apply></Condition>
35 <ObligationExpressions>
36 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="system:deduct-budget">
37 ...</ObligationExpression>
38 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="user:email">
39 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="requester">
40 <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="subject-id" Category="access-subject"/>
41 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
42 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="emailId">
43 <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="manager-email" Category="access-subject"/>
44 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
45 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="duration">
46 <AttributeValue DataType="#dayTimeDuration">P1DT2H</AttributeValue>
47 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
48 </ObligationExpression></ObligationExpressions>
49 </Rule>
50 <Rule RuleId="second-risk-interval-insuffbudget" Effect="Deny">
51 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
52 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-2"></VariableReference>
53 <Apply FunctionId="function:not">
54 <VariableReference VariableId="budget-check-1"></Apply>
55 </Apply></Condition>
56 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="system:inform-budget">
57 ...</ObligationExpression>
58 </Rule>
59 <Rule RuleId="third-risk-interval" Effect="Deny">
60 <Condition><VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-3"/></Condition>
61 </Rule></Policy>
Figure 3.9: Complex Risk Mitigation <Policy>
obligation by naming them differently in <ObligationId>s (see Figure 3.9, lines 38-39), and
leave the PEP to interpret the difference and handle them differently.3.6. DISCUSSION 36
3.5.4 Implementing the obligations service
We now propose an extensible structure of the PEP to support obligation monitoring and enforce-
ment as shown in Figure 3.10. We describe how this structure manages the different kinds of obli-
gations returned by the PDP after an access request has been evaluated in order to comply with the
previously deﬁned extended model. When PEP receives a response that contains an authorisation
decision and a list of obligations (system and user obligations), it forwards the obligation set to the
obligation handler before enforcing the decision (step 1). The obligation handler classiﬁes these
obligations into two sets: system obligations and user obligations, and forwards system obliga-
tions to the obligation enforcement point (step 2). The obligation enforcement point performs the
system obligations by invoking corresponding fulﬁllment module inside. This fulﬁllment modules
are responsible to understand and correctly enforce the obligations, each of which is designed to
support a particular type of obligation actions. For example, one module is to handle the deduc-
tion of a deposit for a requester’s budget, and the other is to execute logging and auditing. This
modular structure allow us to maintain the basic obligation handling structure, adding the support
for new obligations when needed. Once these system obligations are successfully performed, the
PEP will be notiﬁed so as to proceed with the decision enforcement1 (steps 3-4b). Meanwhile,
the obligation handler forwards user obligations to the fulﬁllment monitor (step 4c), which makes
these obligations switch into active states according to their temporal constraints and current sys-
tem clock. Additionally, the fulﬁllment monitor maintains the list of pending user obligations. It
checks whether any pending obligations are fulﬁlled by a user-initiated action, and if any have
fulﬁlled, it notiﬁes the obligation handler. It also monitors whether any pending obligations that
have deadlines that have been passed without appropriate actions occurred, and hence it notiﬁes
the obligation handler for those violated obligations (steps 5-6). Like the obligation enforcement
point, the fulﬁllment monitor consists of a number of monitor modules, each of which is imple-
mented to be able to monitor a particular type of user obligations.
In order to implement budget control in our extended model, we instruct the obliga-
tion handler, for each corresponding decision, to process the list of obligations in an order
hos
0;os
1;:::;ou
i ;ou
j;:::;os
ni, where os
0 is the system action that deducts deposit from the requester’s
budget, while os
n is the system action that returns the deducted budget back to the requester’s ac-
count. It means that os
n will be only executed if the previous user obligations hou
i ;:::;ou
n 1i are
successfully fulﬁlled.
In short, we propose an architectural structure for implementing the obligations service com-
ponent deﬁned in the XACML standard. Our proposed approach supports the enforcement of
both system and user obligations in a generic manner without changing the standard XACML
architecture and language.
3.6 Discussion
There is a considerable body of work on risk-aware access control, much of it focusing on devel-
oping models for incorporating risk in multi-level security (Cheng et al., 2007; Ni et al., 2010)
and role-based access control (Bijon et al., 2012; Chen and Crampton, 2011). Very little of that
1This is consistent with the way deﬁned in the XACML speciﬁcation; that is, an authorisation decision can only be
enforced if the PEP can understand and discharge the returned obligations (OASIS, 2013, Section 2)3.6. DISCUSSION 37
Figure 3.10: The extended architecture for supporting obligations
research is concerned with the authorisation architectural design that accommodates the awareness
of risk, with the exception of the work of Chen et al. (2010). The latter work extends XACML with
new XML languages and functional components to support risk-adaptive access control. In con-
trast, our approach to implementing RAAC is fully compliant with the XACML standard without
introducing extra elements.
Baracaldo and Joshi (2012) propose a model that includes risk and trust in RBAC systems
in order to react to anomalous behaviour and insider threats. The model deﬁnes, for every user,
a trust value that is based on the history of the user and the context of the system. Every user
can request to temporally activate some roles in order to access to the related permission set. At
every request is associated a risk value that should include the imminent risk associated with the
permissions acquired through the roles, and the risk due to inference of unauthorized objects. The
model supports generic risk mitigation mechanism but doesn’t specify any possible mechanism
and thus doesn’t provide any user obligation monitoring system. Moreover the model is built upon
the RBAC model and allows the assignment of permissions to the user only by means of a role
activation. We take a more generic approach that associates a risk mitigation strategy to a generic
permission that can be singularly activated.
The XACML standard treats a system obligation as an attribute assignment, and leaves the
interpretation of these obligations to the PEP. Further, it does not provide support for user obli-
gations. In the XACML technical committee, there is some work, called “Obligation Fami-
lies” (OASIS, 2007), which attempts to deﬁne additional mechanisms for obligation processing
and enforcement, but this is very preliminary and is not reﬂected in the current XACML standard.
Additionally, Li et al. (2012) recently introduced a comprehensive speciﬁcation and processing
model for obligations by extending XACML speciﬁcation and architecture. Certainly this work
is complementary to our approach to handling obligations, but we take a different view that, for
someone who is committed to existing XACML architecture, it would be straightforward to use
our approach for supporting user obligations and incorporating the notion of risk.Chapter 4
Risk-Aware GBAC
4.1 Running example
In this chapter we introduce a risk-aware group-based access control (RA-GBAC) model as a way
topromoteoptimalpermissionsallocationandsharing, onthebasisofthealreadymentionedleast-
privilege principle, in a dynamic collaborative environment. In order to illustrate the motivations
that led us to the deﬁnition of this RA-GBAC model and the basic requirements that this model
has to satisfy we introduce an example scenario that will show how this model works and how it
can be useful for managing some collaboration scenarios, especially in an emergency situation.
After a car accident, Alice is taken by an ambulance to the nearest hospital. The hospital is
facing an emergency situation and most of the clinical staff members are already busy in other
emergency interventions. Bob is a surgeon who is working in the emergency room of the hospital.
Carol is a nurse trainee and at the moment is the only nurse that is not busy in other interventions.
Charlie is an anaesthetist trainee, and is the only anaesthetist not busy in other interventions. The
relevant part of the role hierarchy of this hospital is showed in Figure 4.1. A nurse and an anaes-
thetist can access to all of the permissions associated respectively with the nurse trainee and the
anaesthetist trainee role. A nurse trainee and a anaesthetist trainee can access respectively only
to some of the nurse and anaesthetist permissions. Every employee of the hospital act empow-
ering one or more roles and can use his risk budget to temporally activate other roles using the
risk-aware RBAC model deﬁned in Section 2.1.1.
Figure 4.1: Scenario role hierarchy
After a quick visit, Carol determines that Alice needs to be brought to the emergency room
for a surgical operation. To operate, Bob needs the assistance of a nurse and an anaesthetist but4.2. MOTIVATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 39
there are not any one available other than, respectively, Carol and Charlie. Carol would like to
temporally activate the nurse role. She sends a request to the access control system. The system
assess a risk-value for the request that lies in a middle range but she doesn’t have the amount of
budget deﬁned by the risk mitigation strategy for granting an access in that risk-range. Charlie as
well would like to temporally activate the anaesthetist role, but he doesn’t have the budget value
deﬁned for his risk range. It could be reasonable in this situation for Bob, Carol and Charlie to
form a team in order to share the responsibilities for the risk incurred by allowing Carol to activate
thenurse roleand Charlieto activatetheanaesthetist role. Inparticular Caroland Charliecoulduse
some of the Bob’s budget to temporally activate their roles. This would be an advantage for Carol
and Charlie, that could access to some permission using Bob’s budget. Bob would be responsible
for both Carol and Charlie, and could lose part of his budget if they misuse their permission or
don’t fulﬁl some of the resulting obligations but, doing so, he could proceed with the surgical
operation.
4.2 Motivations and requirements
The example from the previous section led us to the conclusion that there is need for the deﬁnition
of an access control framework that promotes the sharing of permissions between a collective of
users that collaborate in a system for the fulﬁlment of a common goal. In particular, it would be
reasonable to allow a user, that acting as an individual would not be granted a given permission,
to access to that permission in behalf of a group of users in which he acts together with some
more trustworthy users. In this way, the members of the group would share, not only the access
permissions, butalsotheresponsibilitiesincaseofmisuseofthosepermissions. Whenconsidering
the RAAC model deﬁned in Section 3.5.1 this means that all the members of the group will be
responsible for the fulﬁlment of the obligations returned when granting an access. This situation
could result in some risk for the users with greater trustworthiness in the group since they could
result co-responsible for the less trustworthy users misusing the shared permissions. This risk
could be considered acceptable by these users in those situation when they need to delegate some
important task that, for some reasons, they cannot fulﬁl on their own and for which the needed
permissions would not normally be granted to a less trustworthy user because of their budget
value being too low.
To develop a generic model that can be used for managing both collaborative and individual
access requests, always in respect of some reasonable security boundaries, we identiﬁed some
requirements. Recall that, in our individual RAAC abstract model, when the risk value is in the
last range of a risk mitigation strategy, the returned decision will always be deny, no matter how
high is the user’s budget. If the risk for any member of the team accessing individually at a
given permission lies on the last range, we want any access request from the team for the given
permission to be denied. Another requirement states that, when evaluating an access request for a
team which have only one member, the decision has to be equivalent to the one the model deﬁned
in Section 3.5.1 would have returned for the given member acting as an individual. Doing so
we don’t need to implement two different models, one for individual and one for collaborative
requests. We just need to deﬁne one singleton group for every user, and use these groups when we
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Recall that, in our example scenario (Section 4.1) all the permissions refer to the temporary
activation of a role to which a subject would not normally be allowed and that, in order to fulﬁl
its job, the team of the example needs both the permissions sets associated to the activation of
the nurse and the anaesthetist role. Consider the case in which the team asks for the two permis-
sions once at a time and, while the request for activating the nurse role is granted, the one for
the anaesthetist role is denied because the group members cannot provide the needed budget or
because of a too high risk level. In this situation it would be useless, and so even dangerous for the
system, to allow the team to activate the nurse role. For this reason we introduce in our model a
complex permission that is, in fact, a set of permission that can be activated with a single request.
Moreover, since when a risky permission is granted to a team, all the members of the team will be
considered responsible for the permissions eventually being misused, it is reasonable to allow all
these users to beneﬁt from the allowed access to this permission. This means that all the users that
are members of the team will have to be able to execute the risky permissions. In our example this
means that every user of the team is allowed to activate all the roles associated with the task. It is
not reasonable to require that all the users of one team that want to use the shared permissions have
to do this in the same instant of time. For this reason, we introduce the concept of task as a set of
permission associated to a time duration, during which, starting from the activation time-instant,
the task is considered valid. All the users of the team can access to all the permission associated
with the task during this whole time-interval.
While we are interested in monitoring the fulﬁlment of the obligations by the users, it is out
of the scope of an access control system to monitor whether a task or not will be correctly fulﬁlled
by a group of users. Our goal in fact is only to provide a user, or a group of users with all, but no
more of the permissions they need to perform their job tasks.
4.3 Formal model
4.3.1 Integrating tasks into RAAC
There has been some work on task-based authorisation (Irwin et al., 2008; Thomas and Sandhu,
1997), where tasks are introduced as a central concept that associates users to permissions. Specif-
ically, in task-based systems, a task is treated as a ﬁrst-class entity that is associated with a set of
permissions that the system deems to be necessary to fulﬁl the task. In addition, a task is often
associated with a temporal constraint, indicating when it should be ﬁnished. This way of mod-
elling tasks provides a simple and natural way to achieve the least-privilege principle (Saltzer and
Schroeder, 1975) by restricting a set of permissions that is required for the task, and making those
permissions only available during the task fulﬁlment.
When a task arises in a system, the task may be assigned to a single user or to a group of users
who collaboratively fulﬁl it. That is, only when users are assigned to a task, these users can use
the permissions associated with the task. In general, the assignment of tasks to users can be done
in two different ways. The system may have a means of assigning tasks to the most appropriate
users, and subsequently these users are obliged to perform the tasks. Alternatively, in a more
ﬂexible setting, users initiate requests to perform tasks in order to gain beneﬁts of accomplishing
the tasks. In both ways, the system must incorporate a module, which we call the authorisation
decision function (ADF), that can ensure that the user(s) to whom a task is assigned, is authorised4.3. FORMAL MODEL 41
to perform the task.
In most existing approaches, the ADF determines whether a user is permitted to perform a
task according to some predeﬁned authorisation policies. However, in many situations, those poli-
cies are found too rigid, which results in some important task being unable to be carried out, even
though some suitable users are available. In this chapter, we propose a risk-aware authorisation
mechanism that determines whether to allocate a task to a set of users based on the risk of those
users to misuse the permissions associated with the task. Hereafter, we deﬁne a risk-aware model
following the way where users initialise requests to perform tasks, since the design of our risk-
aware model can be readily modiﬁed to accommodate the static assignment of users to tasks by
the system.
4.3.2 Constructing a reference monitor
Let G be a set of groups or teams, and UG U G be a user-group assignment relation. Given
g 2 G, we write Users(g) for the set of users to which the group g is explicitly assigned by the
UG relation; that is, Users(g) = fu 2 U : (u;g) 2 UGg. Given g 2 G, we say that Users(g) is
a set of members of g. For the sake of completeness, for all u 2 U, we assume there exists a
corresponding g 2 G, where Users(g) = fug. Given g1;g2 2 G, we deﬁne g1 6 g2 if and only if
Users(g1)Users(g2). Clearly, 6 is a partial order on G, and we write hG;6i to denote the partial
ordered set of groups G. In this section, we do not specify the authorisation semantics in terms of
hierarchical organization of groups, but we will discuss the beneﬁts for such group organization in
Chapter 5.
Similarly, we deﬁnea budgetforeach groupin thesystem. Giveng2G, wewriteb(g)2[0;1]
to denote the budget of g; the initial value of b(g) is deﬁned to be 0 for all g. When members of
group g decide to initial a request to perform a particular task, they have to provide the system with
enough budget. There are different way in which we can decide how much budget every user has
to put in order to reach the needed value. In this section we only introduce two different example
mechanisms which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 5. The total available team-budget could
be calculated by the system as the sum of all the budget values of the members. In this case, the
system has to decide, when the permission of activating a task is granted, which is the amount of
budget that every user has to put. We discuss some sharing mechanism for this case in Chapter
5. Another possibility is to deﬁne, for every team, an attribute called team-budget. Every
user, at any moment, can top-up the team-budget using part of his individual budget. A request
is then granted only if the team-budget is higher than the required value. This mechanism is not
transparent to the users and requires them to manage their budget values. On the other hand it
allows the different members to negotiate the budget deposit that everyone has to use to join a
team in requesting an access and thus how to share the responsibilities incurred by requesting to
fulﬁl a task. For the basic model now, we assume that all members contribute their budgets equally
regardless the relative seniority of the members in the group. When a user u logins in the system,
u can either request to invoke permissions or to perform tasks. When u requests to perform a
particular task, u has to choose which group to be the entity to which authorisation of performing
the task is evaluated. Given a user u2U, we write Grps(u) for the set of groups to which a user u is
explicitly assigned by the UG relation; that is Grps(u) = fg 2 G : (u;g) 2 UGg. Clearly, u is only
allowed to activate a group g such that g 2 Grps(u), and all authorisation information associated4.3. FORMAL MODEL 42
with g are passed into the ADF to determine whether g is authorised to perform the task.
Let K be a set of tasks, and P be a set of permissions. We introduce a permission-task
assignment relation PK  PK. Given k 2 K, we write Prms(k) for the set of permissions to
which the task k is explicitly assigned by the PK relation; that is, Prms(k)=fp2 p:(p;k)2PKg.
In other words, Prms(k) is a set of permissions that is required to perform the task. We model an
collective obligation og as a pair hA;li, where A is a set of actions and l is a symbolic temporal
interval during which A must be performed by one of the members of g. All the members of the
group are to be considered responsible for a failure in fulﬁlling the obligation before the deadline.
System obligations os are deﬁned in the same way as in the RAAC model described in Section
2.1.1. We write ? to denote the “null” obligation; the requesting user or PEP is not required
to do anything for the null obligation. We deﬁne Os and Og respectively as a set of system and
collective obligations. We then associate each task k with a risk mitigation strategy, denoted by
m(k). Clearly, the deﬁnition of the risk mitigation strategy is determined by all the permissions
associated with task k. We introduce a function l : K ! L, where l(k) denotes the symbolic
temporal interval during which the task k should be completed. We also introduce a group-task
assignment relation GKT GKT , where (g;k;T)2GKT means that the assignment of task k
to group g is enabled for all points t 2 T. When k is granted to be performed by a particular group
g, l(k) is transformed into a concrete time interval T = [ts;te], and a tuple hg;k;Ti is appended
into GKT. Let ti be an instant of time, C be a set of variables hUG;GKT;PK;mi that represent the
state of the system and C(ti) be a values assignment, for the variable in C, at the instant of time ti.
We now present how the authorisation decision function determines whether to grant a group the
permission to perform a task.
We deﬁne a risk function Riskg : GK C(ti) ! [0;1] that computes the risk of granting a
group to perform a task. We model a group request as a tuple hg;k;tii, where g 2 G is a group and
k 2 K is a task and ti represents the instant of time in which the request is sent. Given a group
request hg;k;tii, we believe that, depending on the context C(ti) there are a number of different
ways to compute Riskg(g;k;C(ti)) as a function of Risk(u;k;C(ti)) for all u 2 Users(g). Before
discussing different possibilities of computing Riskg(g;k;C(ti)), let us introduce the authorisation
decision function Authg. Given a group request hg;k;C(ti)i we deﬁne an authorisation function
Authg as:
Authg(hg;k;tii) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
hallow; / 0;0i if Riskg(g;k;C(ti)) < k1;
Budg(hg;ki;Os
i;O
g
i ;di) if Riskg(g;k;C(ti)) 2 [ki;ki+1), 1 6 i < n;
hdeny; / 0;0i otherwise;
(4.1)
where the budget checker function Budg is deﬁned as,
Budg(hg;ki;Os
i;O
g
i ;di) =
8
<
:
hallow;Os
i;O
g
i ;jUsers(g)jdii if b(g) > jUsers(g)jdi;
hdeny;?;?;jUsers(g)jdii otherwise:
(4.2)
Note that, RAAC can be seen as a special case of RAACg in which jUsers(g)j = 1 for all4.3. FORMAL MODEL 43
g 2 G. In fact, we can interpret a group request hg;ki as a set of individual requests hu;ki for all
u 2 Users(g). We then determine the risk of granting a group request by combining the risk of
granting individual requests. We believe that there are at least two ways to compute the risk of
granting a group request, which may result in different types of obligation assigned to a group
and different amounts of budget a group need to put together. Given a group request hg;ki, one
possibility is to compute the risk of granting this request to be
Risk(t;k) = maxfRisk(u;k) : u 2 Users(g)g: (4.3)
In other words, the risk of granting hg;ki is determined by the maximum value in the set
comprising the risk of all individual accesses. This is a conservative approach in a sense that the
risk of a group request is determined by the least trustworthy individual in the group, thereby all
members in the group are collectively responsible to perform a more restrictive obligation. In
addition, on the basis of equally share of budget among the members of a group, some members in
the group actually pay more budget than the one they need on individual accesses. An alternative
way of computing the risk associated with a group request hg;ki is to compute
åRisk(u;k) : u 2 Users(g)
jUsers(g)j
:
This computation essentially takes the average of risks associated with individual accesses from
all members in the group. In this case, a low trustworthy user is beneﬁt for being in the group,
because she may be able to gain access to some resources by associating with high trustworthy
users in the group.
From the point of view of safety, we may wish to prevent a group from performing a task if
there exists a group member whose individual request to this task is too risky to be granted. There-
fore it may be desirable to impose a constraint on the group request, that is, for all u 2 Users(g),
Risk(u;k) < kn, where kn is most risky threshold deﬁned in the risk mitigation strategy associated
with k. In this case, for some users who have ran out budget due to unfulﬁlled obligations, they can
still request to perform tasks by presenting a group with other members putting individual budgets
into the group budget. Of course, it may be appropriate to compute the risk of a group access as
a more complex function of the risks associated with individual accesses, which will be discussed
in Chapter 5
We now introduce an authorisation function that determines whether users are authorised to
perform permissions. Given a request at time t, denoted by hu;p;ti, and a RAACg state C(ti),
we deﬁne an authorisation decision function Authu that returns allow if there exists g;k such that
hu;gi 2 UG, hg;k;ti 2 GKT and hp;ki 2 PK; and deny (otherwise).
4.3.3 Enforcing authorisation decisions
There are a few actions that the policy enforcement point (PEP) is required to perform when
receiving an allow decision from the authorisation function Authg. Firstly, when an authorisation
decision regarding hg;ki along with the corresponding obligations Os
i;O
g
i arrive at the PEP, it tries
to fulﬁl Os
i and, only if this is possible, it enforces the decision and transforms the obligations in
O
g
i into a more concrete form whose execution the system can monitor. At the same time, the PEP4.4. THE XACML IMPLEMENTATION 44
needs to deduct the deposit jUsers(g)jdi from the group budget b(g). When all the obligations
in O
g
i are fulﬁlled by one of the members in g, di is returned to all members u 2 Users(g) in case
that the equally sharing mechanism is adopted. We will discuss the other possible mechanisms for
sharing budgets among group members in Chapter 5.
As we mentioned, when a request hg;ki is granted, the PEP should also explicitly assign the
task k to the granted group g, so that only members of g can carry out the task via the invocation
of permissions associated with the task.1 Speciﬁcally, suppose a request from g to perform k is
allowed and l(k)=l, the PEP transforms l into a concrete time interval T =[ts;te] and then update
GKT with GKT   GKT [hg;k;Ti.
4.4 The XACML implementation
In this section we show how it is possible to use the XACML architecture described in Section 3
to implement, introducing only some minor changes, the RA-GBAC model of Section 4.3. The
activation of a task is associated with a complex mitigation strategy, while, when asking for a
speciﬁc permission, a subject always have to specify an active task associated with that permis-
sion. In order to obtain access, the task has to be assigned to a team of which the subject is a
member. This lead us to the deﬁnition of two types of access request, both to be evaluated by the
PDP: one for the activation of a speciﬁed task in behalf of a team and the other for obtaining a
permission associated to a speciﬁed active task. We can distinguish between these two request-
type using the attribute action-id of the action category that can assume a value in the
set ftask-assignment,obtain-permissiong. Since a subject could be member of more
than one team, when he requests to activate a task he has to specify in behalf of which team he is
acting. Similarly, when requesting to access to a permission, the access subject has to specify, not
only the team, but also the active task associated with the permission.
First of all we illustrate with an example how to write a complex risk mitigation
<PolicySet> that can be associated with the activation of one or more tasks. Then we show
how it is possible to express the rule for granting of a permission associated with an active task
writing a single <PolicySet>. After that we discuss the introduction of some changes in the
previously deﬁned architecture to support the new features of our model.
4.4.1 A complex risk mitigation <PolicySet>
In Figure 4.2 we show an example of risk mitigation <PolicySet> with the same risk and
budget thresholds of the risk mitigation strategy represented in Figure 3.8. We don’t restrict the
target of the <PolicySet> to any speciﬁc task-id value so we can refer to this risk mitigation
strategy and associate it to more than one task. In Line 01 we speciﬁed the first-applicable
rule-combining algorithm because it results in a more efﬁcient evaluation of the policy. In Lines
02-04 we use the <VariableDefinition> element to specify the risk and budget thresholds.
In Lines 05-12 we deﬁne a boolean variable called team-task-check that takes value true
if and only if the access subject is a member of the speciﬁed team and the task has not been yet
activated. We encode these two conditions in a variable because we need to check them in the
<Condition> element of every <Rule> of the risk mitigation policy. Note that, in deﬁning
1In practice, it is reasonable to “lock” a particular instance of a task only available to the requesting group, but
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this variable, we introduced, like we did for the risk-value attribute in Section 3, two new
categories of attributes, one for the attributes of the team entity and the other for the attributes of
the task entity. This is compliant with XACML 3.0 speciﬁcation and allow us to easily distinguish
betweenattributesoftheaccess-subjectand ofitsteam, orbetweenattributesofthepermissionand
of the task to which the permission is associated. Like in our individual RAAC implementation we
deﬁne a variable for every risk-range that check whether the risk-value for the access request is in
that range. Note that, for the retrieval of the assessed risk value, we use the same attribute name as
in our previous implementation but, in this case, the risk has to be assessed considering that is the
whole team accessing to all the permissions of a task instead of an individual accessing to a single
permission. Similarly to what we did in the XACML implementation of the individual RAAC
model, we deﬁne, for every i-th budget threshold, a variable called budget-check-i that is
evaluated to true if and only if the available budget for the team is greater than the threshold.
To do so, we refer to the team budget as an attribute of the team (Line 23). At this point, the
team budget could be calculated by the related PIP module as the sum of the budget of all the
members. Alternatively we could require the different members to top-up in advance the team
budget using their own individual budget. Recall that, to calculate the budget needed by a team
to activate a task we use the Equation (4.2). The budget threshold is obtained by multiplying
the budget associated with the range in which lies the risk value by the number of members of
the team. In order to easily calculate this value for every rule, we deﬁne a numeric variable
called member-number (Lines 13-16) that counts the members of the team associated with the
request. The budget threshold is calculated applying the double-multiply XACML function
to the previously deﬁned budget-i and member-number variables (Lines 24-26).
The ﬁrst <Rule> element (Lines 27-30) takes as applicability condition the boolean func-
tion not applied to the team-task-check variable and return the Deny decision, eventually
together with some obligations. This rule means that, if the access-subject is not a member of the
speciﬁed team or the task has been already activated, the access request has to be denied. The
following <Rule>s express the decisions to be taken according to the risk mitigation strategy.
For example the <Rule> with id task:r:2 (Lines 33-39) returns the value Permit when the
assessed risk-value is in the second range and the team-budget is greater than the calculated thresh-
old. The condition element of this rule contains references to the variables team-task-check,
risk-check-1 and budget-check-1 described above. In Line 46 we can express some
system and collective obligations. We discuss later in this Chapter how to represent collective
user obligations that apply to the whole team and system obligation for the deduction of the team
budget using the XACML syntax for obligations.
Similarly the fourth <Rule> element (Lines 40-46) speciﬁes that the value the request has
to be denied when the risk-value attributes lies in the second range but the budget is below the
calculated threshold. In this case, system obligations can be used to notify the reason why the
request has been denied.
When an access request of the type task-assignment is evaluated to Permit the
system has to assign the speciﬁed task to the requesting team. To implement this behaviour,
we deﬁne a system obligation at the <Policy> level (Lines 52-59) setting the FullfillOn
attribute to the Permit value. This means that this obligation will be returned when4.4. THE XACML IMPLEMENTATION 46
the result of the <Policy> containing these rules evaluates to Permit. We assign the
system:assign:task value to the ObligationId attribute and we encode the task and
team ids in the <AttributeAssignment> elements.
00 <PolicySet PolicySetId="task:RMS:0" PolicyCombiningAlgId="permit-ovveride">
01 <Policy PolicyId="task:PO" RuleCombiningAlgId="first-applicable">
02 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-0">0.2</VariableDefinition>
03 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-1">0.7</VariableDefinition>
04 <VariableDefinition VariableId="budget-1">0.3</VariableDefinition>
05 <VariableDefinition VariableId="team-task-check">
06 <Apply FunctionId="function:and">
07 <Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of">
08 <AttributeDesignator Category="subject" AttributeId="id" DataType="#string"/>
09 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="member_id" DataType="#string"/>
10 </Apply><Apply FunctionId="not">
11 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="active" DataType="#boolean"/>
12 </Apply></Apply></VariableDefinition>
13 <VariableDefinition VariableId="member-number">
14 <Apply FunctionId="integer-to-double"><Apply FunctionId="string-bag-size">
15 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="member_id" DataType="#string"/>
16 </Apply></Apply></VariableDefinition>
17 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-1">?(0<=risk<0.2)</VariableDefinition>
18 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-2">?(0.2<=risk<0.7)</VariableDefinition>
19 <VariableDefinition VariableId="risk-check-3">?(0.7<=risk<=1)</VariableDefinition>
20 <VariableDefinition VariableId="budget-check-1">
21 <Apply FunctionId="double-greater-than-or-equal">
22 <Apply FunctionId="double-one-and-only">
23 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="budget" DataType="double"/>
24 </Apply><Apply FunctionId="double-multiply">
25 <VariableReference Id="member-number"/><VariableReference Id="budget-1"/>
26 </Apply></Apply></VariableDefinition>
27 <Rule RuleId="task:r:0" Effect="Deny"><Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:not">
28 <VariableReference VariableId="team-task-check"/></Apply></Condition>
29 <ObligationExpressions>...</ObligationExpressions>
30 </Rule><Rule RuleId="task:r:1" Effect="Permit"><Condition>
31 <Apply FunctionId="function:and"><VariableReference VId="team-task-check"/>
32 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-0"/></Apply></Condition></Rule>
33 <Rule RuleId="task:r:2" Effect="Permit">
34 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
35 <VariableReference VariableId="team-task-check"/>
36 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-0"/>
37 <VariableReference VariableId="budget-check-1"/>
38 </Apply></Condition>
39 <ObligationExpressions>...</ObligationExpressions></Rule>
40 <Rule RuleId="task:r:3" Effect="Deny">
41 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
42 <VariableReference VariableId="team-task-check"/>
43 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-1"/>
44 <Apply FunctionId="function:not"><VariableReference VariableId="budget-check-1"/>
45 </Apply></Apply></Condition>
46 <ObligationExpressions>...</ObligationExpressions></Rule>
47 <Rule RuleId="task:r:4" Effect="Permit"><Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
48 <VariableReference VariableId="team-task-check"/>
49 <VariableReference VariableId="risk-check-2"/></Apply></Condition>
50 <ObligationExpressions>...</ObligationExpressions></Rule>
51 <ObligationExpressions>
52 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="system:assign:task" FulfillOn="Permit">
53 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="team_id">
54 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="id" DataType="#string"/>
55 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
56 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="task_id">
57 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="id" DataType="#string"/>
58 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
59 </ObligationExpression></ObligationExpressions></Policy></PolicySet>
Figure 4.2: Risk mitigation policy for task assignment4.5. REPRESENTING AND ENFORCING COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS 47
4.4.2 The assigned-task <PolicySet>
Recall that, according to our RA-GBAC model, in order to get access to a set of permissions, a
team has to activate the relative task. When a task has been activated and assigned to a speciﬁc
team, all the permissions associated with the task will be granted to all the members of the team
during the time-interval in which the task remains active. When requesting for a permission, the
subject is required to specify to the context-handler in behalf of which team he is acting and for
the fulﬁlment of which task he needs to access to the permission. The context-handler have to
include these information in the request context.
In Figure 4.3 we show a <PolicySet> in which we express the rule that allows a subject,
acting in behalf of a team, to access to the permissions associated to a task activated by the speci-
ﬁed team. The <Target> element (Lines 01-04) restricts the applicability of the <PolicySet>
only to the requests with the obtain-permission value assigned to the action-id attribute
of the action category. It contains only one <Policy> element (Lines 5-45) with one inner
<Rule> element (Lines 07-45). Since in our model all the risk mitigation methods are applied
when a task is activated, when its condition is met, this <Rule> returns a Permit response with-
out any user or system obligation. The <Condition> element (Lines 8-44) applies a logic and
function to a sequence of boolean functions. The ﬁrst <Apply> element (Lines 09-12) checks
whether the access subject is member of the team speciﬁed in the request context. From Lines
13 to 26 we check whether the speciﬁed task has been activated and assigned to the team. The
<Apply> element from line 27 to 38 returns true if the task is not yet expired and the one
from line 39 to 44 check returns true if the requested permission is in the permission-set of the
speciﬁed task.
The <PolicySet> doesn’t refer to any speciﬁc subject, team, task or permission thus it
can be used as a generic top-level policy for any requests of the type obtain-permission.
We need to include only one policy like this in our PAP to manage all the possible requests for
a speciﬁc permission. The policy combining algorithm for the <PolicySet> element is set to
deny-unless-permit. This means that, if the condition of the only <Rule> in the policy is
evaluated to false, the <PolicySet> will return a Deny response.
4.5 Representing and enforcing collective obligations
Similarly to what we have done for our individual RAAC implementation, when we write a RA-
GBAC risk mitigation policy, we have to include, in every Permit <Rule>, an obligation for
the deduction of the correspondent team budget value. In Figure 4.4 we show an example for a
collective deduct-budget obligation that could be included in Line 46 of our example RA-GBAC
risk mitigation policy (Figure 4.2) Instead of specifying the access-subject we specify the access-
team from which the deposit has to be deducted (Lines 01-03). In Lines 05-09 we calculate the
deposit amount that have to be deducted. Depending on how we choose to share the deposit
between the team members, the amount could be deducted directly from the team-budget or from
the member’s budget values.
When specifying collective user obligations we can use the same syntax and semantic of
the individual user obligations deﬁned in Section 3.2. Instead of specifying the user, we have to
specify the team that have to fulﬁl the obligation. The main difference is in the implementation of4.5. REPRESENTING AND ENFORCING COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS 48
00 <PolicySet PolicySetId="assigned:task:PS" PolicyCombiningAlgId="deny-unless-permit">
01 <Target><AnyOf><AllOf><Match MatchId="string-equal">
02 <AttributeValue DataType="#string">obtain-permission</AttributeValue>
03 <AttributeDesignator Category="action" AttributeId="action-id" DataType="#string" />
04 </Match></AllOf></AnyOf></Target>
05 <Policy PolicyId="assigned:task:PO" RuleCombiningAlgId="permit-overrides">
06 <Target></Target>
07 <Rule RuleId="assigned:task:R" Effect="Permit">
08 <Condition><Apply FunctionId="function:and">
09 <Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of">
10 <AttributeDesignator Category="subject" AttributeId="id" DataType="string"/>
11 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="member_id" DataType="string"/>
12 </Apply>
13 <Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of">
14 <AttributeDesignator Category="team" AttributeId="id" DataType="#string"/>
15 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="team_id" DataType="#string"/>
16 </Apply>
17 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="activated" DataType="#boolean"/>
18 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-greater-than-or-equal">
19 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-one-and-only">
20 <AttributeDesignator Category="environment" AttributeId="current-dateTime"
21 DataType="dateTime"/>
22 </Apply>
23 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-one-and-only">
24 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="start_time"
25 DataType="dateTime"/>
26 </Apply></Apply>
27 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-greater-than-or-equal">
28 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-add-dayTimeDuration">
29 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-one-and-only">
30 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="start_time"
31 DataType="dateTime"/>
32 </Apply><Apply FunctionId="dayTimeDuration-one-and-only">
33 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="duration"
34 DataType="#dayTimeDuration"/>
35 </Apply></Apply>
36 <Apply FunctionId="dateTime-one-and-only">
37 <AttributeDesignator DataType="dateTime" AttributeId="current-dateTime" />
38 </Apply></Apply>
39 <Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of">
40 <AttributeDesignator Category="task" AttributeId="permission_id"
41 DataType="#string"/>
42 <AttributeDesignator Category="permission" AttributeId="permission_id"
43 DataType="#string"/>
44 </Apply></Apply></Condition>
45 </Rule></Policy></PolicySet>
Figure 4.3: Assigned task policy
00 <ObligationExpression ObligationId="system:deduct-budget">
01 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="access-team">
02 <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="team-id" Category="team"/>
03 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
04 <AttributeAssignmentExpression AttributeId="budget-value">
05 <Apply FunctionId="double-multiply">
06 <VariableReference VariableId="member-number"/>
07 <VariableReference VariableId="budget-1"/>
08 </Apply>
09 </AttributeAssignmentExpression>
10 </ObligationExpression>
Figure 4.4: Collective deduct-budget <ObligationExpression>
the obligation monitor that will have to recognize, for every user action, if the action fulﬁls any of
the obligations assigned to any of the teams of which the user is a member.4.6. EXTENDED ARCHITECTURE 49
4.6 Extended architecture
In this section we describe how we can extend the architecture proposed in Section 3.4 to sup-
port our XACML RA-GBAC implementation. In the <PolicySet> of Figure 4.2 we refer,
using the <AttributeDesignator> element, to attribute of the categories team, task and
permission. These attribute categories are not supported by the standard XACML architecture
an we need to implement, like we did for our risk-assessment-module, a PIP module that
support the retrieval of those categories of attributes. The module that supports the team category
in particular has to provide a method for the retrieval of the available team-budget value. This
method can be implemented in different ways depending on how we deﬁne the sharing of the de-
posit between members of the same team: it could just return the sum of all the deposit budget of
the single members or we could decide to maintain in our data-source a team-budget value that
can be topped up by the members using their individual budgets. Moreover the risk assessment
module needs to be changed in order to account the risk derived by granting the whole set of per-
missions to all the members of the requesting team. In our model we don’t specify how the risk
value should be calculated. It is important to recall that the risk-assessment module of the PIP can
access to all the attributes in the request-context and can interact with the other PIP modules to
retrieve all the attributes that it could need for evaluating the risk associated to the request.
The modular architecture for the handling of system obligation doesn’t need to be changed.
In fact we just need to implement a module for the fulﬁllment of the system:deduct-budget
obligation according to the budget-sharing mechanism that we have chosen.
The modular architecture of the user-obligation monitor deﬁned for our individual RAAC
model remains applicable for the development of the risk-aware GBAC model implementation.
When a new collective obligation arise, we record to which team every obligation is associated.
Like in modular RAAC obligation monitor implementation, for every collective obligation there
has to be a module that implements its monitoring. For every action performed by a subject, the
modules have to check whether the action fulﬁls one of the obligations that are in the pending
obligations list and are associated to one of the team of which the subject is a member.
4.7 Discussion
In this section we discuss some related work on the ﬁeld of group-based access control and the
representation and enforcement of collective obligations.
Recently, interesthasbeengrowingintheﬁeldofteam-basedaccesscontrolasanapproachto
applying access control in collaborative environments such as those involving work-ﬂows. Kalam
et al. (2003) proposed an organization-based access control (OrBAC) model in which the concepts
of role, activity, and view are deﬁned to groups (set of users), actions and objects respectively.
This model provides the basis for their later comprehensive study of obligation policies. In recent
related works, Elrakaiby et al. (2009, 2012) and Cuppens et al. (2013) introduced the notion of
group contexts to represent group relationships and to allow the policy designer to deﬁne shared
responsibilities and alternative duties between more subjects. The limit of this model is that it does
not give us the capability to express every kind of team obligation, in fact responsibilities can only
be shared between subjects empowering the same role, and in particular between all (universally
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Thomas (1997) explored the possibility of introducing the notion of team in an RBAC system
to provide an access control scheme for collaborative environments. Two main requirements have
been identiﬁed by Thomas:
1. the need for a hybrid access control model that:
(a) incorporate the advantages of role-based permission across object types; and
(b) allow to specify ﬁne-grained, identity-based control on individual users in certain
roles, and to individual object instances.
2. the need to distinguish the passive concept of permission assignment from the active concept
of context-based permission activation.
These two requirements are derived by the study of an healthcare scenario with clinical staff
collaborating in a team. Teams are dynamically formed as collections of staff members, each adopt
one or more roles. At any moment a member can join or leave the team. Teams can be assigned
to different patients. Data from a patient can be accessed only by members of the team to which
he has been assigned. The permission that every member has to access clinical records should
reﬂect his/her role in providing care to a speciﬁc patient. These permissions should be deactivated
when the patient is discharged. Thus we want to be able to assign permissions to a particular
user/team regarding a speciﬁc object and not all the objects of the same type. As Thomas states
in his work, the basic RBAC scheme cannot be used to enforce the requirements 1.(a) and 1.(b)
together. Trying to satisfy both of these, he proposed TeaM based Access Control (TMAC), where
team deﬁnitions include the collaboration context that is needed to satisfy the requirement 1.(b).
Every team is associated with certain resources, and users who belong to a team, are assigned a
subset of a set of Team roles TR and given access to resources available to the team. However, the
effective permissions of a user are always derived from permission types deﬁned for roles that the
user belongs to. The main limitation of this model is that it restricts the roles that a user can take
on while joining a team. The ideas behind this model have major inﬂuence on the development of
our risk-aware GBAC model.
In related works Royakkers and Dignum (2000) and Grossi et al. (2004) investigate the rep-
resentation, formalization and enforcement of collective obligations. They introduce concepts as
commitment, delegation and collective plans. A collective obligation is represented as a com-
plex task, composed of different subtasks. They propose an approach based on the analysis of
the collective plan, and of the fulﬁlment of single sub-tasks to understand which users have to be
considered responsible for the failure in the fulﬁlment of a collective obligation. We believe that,
for our purpose there is no need to represent collective obligation as complex tasks. In access
control, in fact, obligations are usually simple tasks that can be performed by one of the members.
Instead of applying such an analysis to understand who we have is responsible for a failure, we
propose an approach based on the budget deposit that allow the users to decide how much they
can be considered responsible for the fulﬁlment of an obligation.
Another approach is taken by Garion and Cholvy (2007) that propose a way to derive a set
of individual obligations from a collective obligation. In case of failure in the fulﬁlment of an
obligation, they state that the whole group have to be considered responsible. This approach is4.8. SUMMARY 51
similar to ours but we provide a way for the members to share responsibilities in a more ﬂexible
way so that every user can decide how much he can be considered responsible for the fulﬁlment
of an obligation.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter we have deﬁned a formal abstract model for implementing a RA-GBAC system.
We then proposed an XACML improved architecture showing how it is possible to write a set of
standard XACML policies that implement our model. We propose a modular architecture that lets
the system administrators free to implement custom risk-assessment function and budget sharing
mechanism. These two components can be implemented respectively in the application dependent
risk-assessment module of the PIP and in the obligations handler of the PEP. However we haven’t
proposed any mechanism or strategy for the deﬁnition of these two modules. In the next chapter
we propose a more detailed scenario that brings together elements from the two previous running
examples. While discussing the scenario and showing how our model applies to it, we propose
some risk-assessment and budget sharing mechanism and underline some issues about the model
and its implementation in a real system.Chapter 5
Healthcare Scenario and Discussion
In this chapter we present a more detailed example based on the healthcare scenario introduced in
Section 4.1, showing why the RAAC model described in Section 2.1.1 is not ﬂexible enough when
handling risky permissions in a collaborative environment and thus motivating the introduction of
our risk-aware GBAC model. We use this example to discuss issues and alternative approaches to
develop RA-GBAC models. We show in detail, providing some example risk and budget values,
how the model and its XACML implementation work. While discussing the example, we make
some remarks on how to write a coherent risk mitigation strategy for a task that contains multiple
permissions, given the risk mitigation strategies for those single permissions. We discuss in detail
some possible choices for the team risk-assessment algorithm and the budget-share mechanism.
We also consider the possibility to deﬁning some additional security constraints at the model.
5.1 Healthcare example scenario
After a car accident, Alice is taken by an ambulance to the nearest hospital. The hospital is facing
an emergency situation and most of the clinical staff members are already busy in other emergency
interventions. Bob is a surgeon who is working in the emergency room of the hospital. Carol is a
nurse trainee and at the moment is the only nurse that is not busy in other interventions. Charlie
is an anaesthetist trainee, and is the only anaesthetist not busy in other interventions. The relevant
part of the role hierarchy of this hospital is showed in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Scenario role hierarchy
A nurse can access to all of the permission associated with the nurse trainee role while a
nurse trainee can access only to some of the nurse permissions. An anaesthetist can access to5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 53
all of the permission associated with the anaesthetist trainee while an anaesthetist trainee can
access to only some of the permission of an anaesthetist. Every employee of the hospital act
empowering one or more roles and can temporally activate other roles according to the risk-aware
RBAC model. The budget values for every user are showed in Table 5.1.
Bob 0.95
Carol 0.25
Charlie 0.3
Table 5.1: Individual budget values
After a quick visit, Carol determines that Alice needs to be brought to the emergency room
for a surgical operation. To operate, Bob needs the assistance of a nurse and an anaesthetist but
there are not any one available other than, respectively, Carol and Charlie. Carol and Charlie
would like to temporally activate respectively the nurse and the anaesthetist roles. Let’s consider
the case in which the Carol and Charlie try to activate the respectively needed roles according
to the previously deﬁned risk-aware RBAC model. Recall that the activation of a role to which
the user is not normally allowed is associated with a risk mitigation strategy. The risk mitigation
strategies for the activation of the two roles are showed in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3
Nurse RMS
Risk 0.2 0.5 0.8
Budget 0 0.3 0.4
Obligations ? O1 O2
Table 5.2: Nurse RMS
Anaesthetist RMS
Risk 0.2 0.45 0.75
Budget 0 0.35 0.4
Obligations ? O3 O4
Table 5.3: Anaesthetist RMS
Every column represents a risk range. For 0  i  n, let ri be the risk thresholds of the risk
mitigation strategy. We deﬁne constant values for r0 as 0 and for rn as 1. For 1in 1, ri takes
the value on the ﬁrst row of the i-th column. The second and third rows of the i-th column deﬁne
the needed budget value and the set of obligations to be returned when the assessed risk value is
between ri 1 and ri. When the risk value is between rn 1 and rn the request is always denied.
For example the second column of Table 5.2 specify that, when 0:2 < risk-value  0:5 the needed
budget value is 0.3 and the obligations in O1 have to be returned.
The risk-assessment algorithm used in the scenario system assess a risk-value of 0.47 for
Carol activating the nurse role. This means that Carol would need to use 0.3 budget for accessing
to the permissions associated with the nurse role. As we can see in Table 5.1 Carol has only
0.25 available budget value so is not able to activate the nurse role. In the same way, the system
assessed a risk-value of 0.35 for Charlie activating the anaesthetist role thus, according to Table
5.3, Charlie would need to use a deposit of 0.35 to obtain the permission but his budget-value is5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 54
only 0.3.
It could be reasonable in this situation for Bob, Carol and Charlie to form a team in order
to share the responsibilities for the risk incurred by allowing Carol to activate the nurse role and
Charlie to activate the anaesthetist role. In particular Carol and Charlie could use some of Bob’s
budget to temporally activate their roles. This would be an advantage for Carol and Charlie, that
could access to some permission using part of Bob’s budget. Bob would be partly responsible
for both Carol and Charlie, and could lose part of his budget if they misuse their permission or if
nobody fulﬁl some of the resulting obligations but, doing so, he could proceed with the surgical
operation.
5.1.1 Task deﬁnition and its RMS
Recall that, in our RB-RAAC model, a user can empower one or more roles and can submit a
request to the system in order to temporarily activate a role to which he is not normally allowed.
Every role activation is seen as a single permission and is associated with a risk mitigation strat-
egy. We now want to apply our RA-GBAC model into the example scenario. Recall that, to fulﬁl
their job, Bob, Carol and Charlie need the permissions to activate all the roles surgeon, nurse
and anaesthetist. According to the RA-GBAC model, we need to create a task that groups
together all these permission for a time-interval large enough to allow them to complete the sur-
gical intervention. We named this task as emergency:intervention:1. Note that, in this
particular case, since we know in advance that, in the requesting team, there is a staff member
that is already allowed to empower the surgeon role and he is the only one who need to use those
permissions, it would not be necessary to include this permission in the task’s permission-set. In a
general case, however, when deﬁning a task, we don’t know which team is going to request to fulﬁl
the task, thus, we have to include all the permissions that are necessary for the task to be fulﬁlled
by a generic team. The fact that one of the members of the requesting team is already enabled
to activate the surgeon role should reﬂect in a lower risk-value returned by the risk-assessment
algorithm.
This task has then to be associated with a risk mitigation strategy. Our risk-aware GBAC
model has to be deﬁned considering the possible consequences of granting to all the members of a
team all the permissions in the task’s permission-set for the time-interval needed to complete the
task. Recall that the needed-budget evaluation (Equation 4.2) and the risk-assessment algorithm
already take into account the size and the composition of the group’s members set. The risk
mitigation strategy for the task has to be deﬁned considering only which permissions and for how
long they have to be granted. According to our model, others factors based on the context of the
system (e.g. the task criticality) have to be considered in the risk assessment procedure. In some
scenarios, the risk mitigation strategies for some predeﬁned complex tasks could be provided a
priori by the system administrator. However in other cases it’s not possible to know in advance all
the possible types of task that could need to be fulﬁlled in a system. For this reason, it would be
interesting to deﬁne a mechanism that, given a task, its duration and the risk-mitigation strategies
for the permissions required to fulﬁl it1, calculates and returns a RMS to associate with it. This
is outside the scope of our work and, in this example, we will use a predeﬁned RMS for the
1Recall that in the RA-GBAC model there is no deﬁnition of RMS for a single permission, it would be useful to
maintain this deﬁnition in case we want to automatically calculate the tasks’ RMS when needed.5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 55
emergency:intervention:1 task (Table 5.4).
Task RMS
Risk 0.2 0.5 0.8
Budget 0 0.3 0.45
Obligations ? O5 O6
Table 5.4: Task RMS
5.1.2 Team risk calculation
When a user wants to access to some permission, in behalf of a team, in order to fulﬁl a task, ﬁrstly
he has to send a request to the access control system to be assigned to the speciﬁc task. The task
is associated to a risk mitigation strategy and, in order to take a decision, the system has to assess
the risk incurred by granting the permission-set associated with the task to all the members of the
team. We propose an approach for the risk assessment procedure that consists in two steps:
1. Firstly, for every user we have to assess the risk incurred by granting to him the set of
permissions associated with the task for the duration of the task.
2. After that we have to calculate, given the risk associated to every single user, the combined
risk for the whole team
In our abstract model we don’t deﬁne any speciﬁc mechanism for the risk assessment for
an individual. Moreover, in our XACML based risk-aware GBAC implementation, we provide
an interface to implement a risk assessment module. The developer of an access control system
based on our model is free to deﬁne his own risk assessment algorithm and to implement it into the
risk-assessment module. The lack of a risk-assessment algorithm for individual user-permission
assignmentiscertainlyontoftheissuesthatshouldbeaddressedbyfutureworks. Wenowsuppose
that we already have assessed a risk-value for every user-permission assignment and, given these
values as input, we propose a strategy for the assessment of the risk associated with a team-task
assignment.
Let K be a task, t be the time-interval in which K remains active and P = fp1;p2;:::;png
be the set of permissions associated with K. Let G = fu1;u2;:::;umg be a group of m users who
requests to fulﬁl K. We call r(i;j) the risk assessed by the system for granting to the ith member
of G the jth permission of K. Recall that the risk associated with a subject-permission assignment
reﬂects the likelihood of the permission being misused by that subject. The risk incurred by
assigning a task to an individual subject should represent the likelihood of that subject misusing at
least one of the permissions included in the task’s permissions set during the time-interval in which
the task remains active. We take a probability calculation approach and we propose a formula for
the calculation of ri as the risk incurred by granting the permission to fulﬁl K to the user ui.
ri = 1 
n
Õ
j=1
(1 ri;j) (5.1)
where ri;j is the probability of ui misusing the permission pj. Thus 1 ri;j represents the probabil-
ity that ui doesn’t misuse permission pj and the product is the probability of the event “ui doesn’t5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 56
misuse any of the permissions of the task”. Our approach is only one possibility and it doesn’t
take into account a lot of factors like the criticality of the task, any kind of correlation between the
different permissions or the duration of the task. However we believe that in most of the cases it
could make sense to calculate the risk in this way.
Considering our scenario we suppose that, using the mechanism described in Formula 5.1,
we assessed, for the task emergency:intervention:1, the ri values showed in Table 5.5.
User ri
Bob 0.1
Carol 0.5
Charlie 0.5
Table 5.5: Individual task-user assignment assessed risk
Once we have assessed a value ri for every member of the group ui we can combine these
values in different ways to obtain the risk r for the assignment of K to the team G. In Formula
4.3 we propose an approach that consists on taking the maximum value between all the ri. This
is a really simple mechanism that is based on the assumption that the less trustworthy member
is the one who is more likely to misuse his permission. However this mechanism doesn’t take
into account the risk of other members misusing one of the permissions of the task’s permission-
set. A more complex risk calculation algorithm that considers the cumulative risk of all the users
misusing their permission could be based on a probability computation. With an approach similar
to the one taken when computing ri (Formula 5.1) we calculate r.
We want to calculate the probability of at least one user ui misusing one or more of the
task’s permissions. We call this event E. For every member of the team ui, 1 ri represents the
probability of him not misusing any of the permissions. The product Õ
m
i=1(1 ri) represents the
probability of all the users not misusing any of their permissions, that corresponds to the event
:E. We can thus calculate the probability of E as P(E) = 1 P(:E) that lead us to the Formula
5.2.
r = 1 
m
Õ
i=1
(1 ri) (5.2)
Although we believe that Formula 5.2 provides a more appropriate risk calculation method
than the one based on the maximum individual risk, it doesn’t take into account some additional
factors like the mutual control that every member exercises over the others when acting together
and sharing responsibilities. In fact we believe that the actual risk-value associated with a team-
task assignment should be considered slightly lower than the value estimated with the probability
computation of Formula 5.2.
However, in our scenario implementation we use a risk-assessment PIP module that imple-
ments this mechanism. Using the already assessed risk-values for the individual-task assignment
presented in Table 5.5 we assess a risk-value for G fulﬁlling the task K of r = 0:775. According to
the risk mitigation strategy of Table 5.4 and the Bud function deﬁned in Formula 4.2, the system,
before assigning K to G, has to check whether the team has an available budget equal or greater
than B = bijGj = 0:453 = 1:35.5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 57
5.1.3 Budget sharing mechanisms
Recall that the way in which the access control system check for the availability of the team-budget
depends on how the budget-sharing mechanism is implemented. In Section 4.3 we proposed two
different approaches:
1. Deﬁning, in the data-source / PIP, a team-budget variable initialized to 0. Every user, at any
time, can top-up the team-budget using his own budget.
2. Deﬁning the team-budget as the sum of all the budget-values of the team-members. The
system decides how much of his budget every users has to use in order to get access.
Wenowdiscussindetailhowthesetwoapproachescanbeimplemented, outliningadvantages
and disadvantages of both the solutions. Recall that in the XACML risk mitigation strategy for the
activation of a task (Figure 4.2) we refer to the team-budget as an attribute of the team category.
In the ﬁrst case the PIP module that supports the retrieval of that attribute has just to return to
the PDP the value of the team-budget attribute. This value has to be previously topped-up by the
team members using their own individual budget. The needed budget value is deducted from the
team-budget when the permission for activating a task is granted to a team and is returned only if
all the obligations have been fulﬁlled. In case we want to be possible, for the members to ask for
having back their budget, we would need to deﬁne a mechanism that allow the system to decide
how much budget every user can get back. Recall that part of the team-budget could have been lost
by the team as a punishment for not having fulﬁlled some obligations. We propose a mechanism
in which, every user can leave the team and take back a part of the team-budget that is proportional
to the value he has topped-up compared to the ones from the other users. It is reasonable to allow
a user to do so only in a situation in which there are no active tasks and pending obligations for the
related team. For every member u(i;j) with 0 < i < n of the team Gj we maintain a variable b(i;j)
that represents his contribution to the actual team-budget value. Let Bj be the amount of budget
currently available for the team. At any moment:
n 1
å
i=0
b(i;j) = Bj (5.3)
When a user ui decides to top-up the team-budget Bj with an amount v taken from his individual
budget, the variables b(i;j) and Bj have to be updated according to the following formulas:
b(i;j) = b(i;j)+v
Bj = Bj +v
When a team obtains the permission to activate a task using a budget value w, every value b(i;j)
has to be updated according to the following formula:
b(i;j) = b(i;j)
(Bj  w)
Bj
(5.4)
After that the amount w has to be deducted from the team budget Bj. If all the obligations returned
by the PDP have been fulﬁlled by the team, all the deducted values, from Bj and b(i;j), have to5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 58
be given back. At any time a user can decide to leave the team and take back his budget-value
b(i;j). The idea behind this mechanism is that, when we deduct a value w from the team budget
Bj, we want to scale every value b(i;j) in a way that respects the proportion between all these
values that the users decided to put and that maintains the validity of Equation 5.3. Let’s consider,
for example, the values of Table 5.1. Bob, Carol and Charlie join a team G1 and decide to put
respectively 0.5, 0.2 and 0.3 for a total team budget value B1 of 1.0. Bob decide then to activate a
task that requires to use 0.4 of the team budget. B1 takes the value 0:6. The value b(i;1) for Bob,
Carol and Charlie are updated according to the Equation 5.4.
b(Bob;1) =
0:50:6
1:0
= 0:3
b(Carol;1) =
0:20:6
1:0
= 0:12
b(Charlie;1) =
0:30:6
1:0
= 0:18
Note that the Equation 5.3 remains valid, in fact:
b(Bob;1)b(Carol;1)+b(Charlie;1) = 0:18+0:12+0:3 = B1 = 0:6
This ﬁrst approach is a safer solution for a user with a high budget that has agreed to form a team
with some other user with lower budget. In fact every member is free to decide how much budget
to put in order to activate a task, and thus how much he is to be considered responsible in case of
the permission being misused or one of the obligations not being fulﬁlled.
In the second case, when the PIP module that supports the attributes of the team category is
asked to return the team-budget value, it has to retrieve all the budget values of the team’s members
and to return their sum to the PDP. If the budget is equal or higher than the needed value, the task
will be assigned to the team and the access control system has to decide how much deposit to
deduct from every user’s individual budget. This approach is transparent to the users that don’t
need to manage their budgets and to know how the system works in detail. On the other hand it is
more risky for a user with a high budget value to join a team with some untrustworthy users. In
fact, since he has no control in how much of his budget will be used for the activation of a task,
the failure in fulﬁlling one of the obligations could result in the user loosing a large part of his
budget. We now describe in detail a mechanism that implements an equal sharing of the budget
showing how it applies to the example scenario and then mention some alternative approaches to
decide how much deposit to take from every team member. Let BK the budget needed for the
activation of the task K and jUj be the number of members of the team G. Ideally we want every
member to put an amount of budget equal to BK
jUj. If one of the members doesn’t have enough
budget, the other users will have to equally contribute an additional deposit to cover the missing
value. In Algorithm 1 we show how we can calculate the amount of required budget for every user
according to this principle In every loop we check whether every user has an amount of budget
higher than the one needed to equally share the remaining deposit. If not, we deduct from every
user an amount equal to the minimum between all the member’s budget. In the following loops
we try to equally divide the remaining deposit between the members that still have some available5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 59
Algorithm 1 Equal budget share algorithm
BK ( needed budget
U = fui : 1  i  ng ( team members
8i : 1  i  n j bi ( budget available for user ui
while BK > 0 do
e ( BK=n
bmin ( minfbi : 1  i  ng
v ( minfe;bming
for i = 1 to n do
bi ( bi v
end for
BK ( BK  vn
for i = 1 to n do
if bi = 0 then
U  U nui
end if
end for
n = jUj
end while
budget.
Let’s consider the activation of the task emergency:intervention:1 by team G. Re-
call that the needed budget for its activation is 1.35, that the available budget values for the mem-
bers of G are shown in Table 5.1 and that its sum evaluates to 1.5. The access control system grants
to G the permission to activate the task and has to decide how much budget every user is going to
pay. In the ﬁrst loop the system take 0.25 from all the members of the team and remove Carol from
set of user’s with any available budget. Bob and Charlie remains respectively with 0.70 and 0.05
of budget. BK takes the value 1:35 0:253 = 0:60. In the following loops the system deducts
0.05 from both Bob and Charlie’s budget and then deducts the remaining 0.50 from Bob’s budget.
Charlie and Carol have no budget left while Bob remains with 0.15 budget. Another approach
could consists on using, for every member, a budget value proportional to the risk assessed for the
single user activating the task (or, if deﬁned, to his trustworthiness).
5.1.4 Security thresholds and constraints
We now discuss the possibility of deﬁning some additional security constraints in the RA-GBAC
model. According to the mechanisms deﬁned in Section 5.1.3, it is possible, for a user with low
budget, to join a team and get access to all the permission activated for that team. This user
cannot contribute to the team budget with a signiﬁcant deposit but will get all the beneﬁts of
the other members. To avoid the occurrence of these situations it would be reasonable to deﬁne
a threshold for a minimum budget contribution to join a team or to be granted the permissions
associated with a task. One possible approach could consist in deﬁning, in every risk mitigation
strategy, a minimum value of budget that every user has to contribute. This value could be ﬁxed
or expressed as a fraction of the total required budget. Moreover, when granting access to a team
for the activation of a particular task, we could require to avoid granting access to untrustworthy
subject for which the risk, calculated for the subject acting as an individual, lies in the last risk
range. One solution could consist in calculating all the risk associated with the members of a team5.1. HEALTHCARE EXAMPLE SCENARIO 60
acting as individuals and grant access to the team only if the maximum of these values is lower
than the last threshold.
A limit of our work consists in the fact that none of our models supports the speciﬁcation
and enforcement of separation of duty constraints. Moreover, it would be interesting in some
situation to be able to determine which of the team members have to be considered responsible
for the failure in the fulﬁlment of a collective obligation. This would involve consideration about
the team plan for the fulﬁlment of the obligation and about the capability of the different user to
fulﬁl the different sub-tasks of which the obligation can be composed. This is outside the scope of
our work and we take a different approach, allowing the user to share responsibility choosing how
much of their budget to deposit.
5.1.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented a scenario example that brings together elements from the two exam-
ples in Section 2.1.1 and 4.1 and discussed some issues about our abstract model and how it can be
implemented in a real scenario. In particular we proposed some mechanisms for risk-assessment
and budget sharing and deﬁned more in detail some algorithms for their implementations. We
suggested a strategy for writing a coherent risk mitigation strategy to be associated with a task that
groups together different permissions and being assigned to a generic team. We outlined which
elements of risk should be considered by the risk-assessment module and which ones we have to
take into account during the deﬁnition of the risk-mitigation strategy.Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter we present a summary of the main contributions of this thesis.
The goal of our work was to study the development of novel access control models that
address the needs to securely share informations in a dynamic collaborative environment, such the
ones in which different subjects can group together, joining a team to collaborate at the fulﬁlment
ofacommongoal. WebelievethatRAACmodelscansuccessfullymanagethesekindofsituations
through an appropriate risk-assessment that takes into account the context informations, the team
size and composition, the criticality of the permissions, and which is the goal or the task that
the team is willing to fulﬁl by using the requested permissions. For these reasons, the deﬁnition
of an appropriate risk-assessment mechanism is often application dependent. We thus decided
to develop our model in a modular way so that, for every implementation of this model in a
real scenario, the system administrator can deﬁne his own risk-assessment algorithm. The main
contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
 We developed an abstract risk-aware access control model. Our work is based on the model
proposed by Chen et al. (2012) and it supports dynamical risk assessment, risk authorization
decision making and system obligation as risk mitigation methods. It uses risk mitigation
strategy to decide, according to the range in which the assessed risk-value lies, whether to
grant or not access for the requesting subject to a permission. We then extended this model
introducing some minor changes to support user obligations and the concept of budget as a
way to encourage the subjects to fulﬁl their obligations.
 We extended the RAAC model and adapted it for the management of permissions in a col-
laborative environment. We introduce the concept of task as a set of permissions associated
with a validity time-interval and the concept of team as a dynamic set of users that decide
to group together and collaborate in order to fulﬁl a common goal. At every team we as-
sociate a team-budget value that uses the individual budget of the members. According to
this value, and to the risk mitigation strategies associated with the tasks, team can request
the permissions to fulﬁl a task. Risk mitigation strategy can return collective obligations as
risk mitigation methods. These are obligations that must be fulﬁlled by the team members
before the expiration of a given deadline.
 We proposed an extended architecture, based on the reference XACML architecture, for
implementing our models in an XACML-based system. This architecture supports the def-
inition of risk mitigation strategies for tasks and permissions using standard features of the6. CONCLUSION 62
XACML policy language. Dynamical risk assessment is seen as a normal attribute retrieval.
In fact we deﬁne a module for the PIP that assess and return the risk-value associated with
a request. This solution does not conform with the PIP deﬁnition. In fact the PIP modules
should only retrieve values from the data-source without processing them. However this
solution allow us to deﬁne a generic risk-assessment algorithm that is not limited by the
feature of XACML language. We also implemented in the enforcement point an obligation
handler that perform system obligations and monitor the fulﬁlment of user and collective
obligations.
 We proposed a semantic for user, collective and system obligations deﬁnition based on
the XACML syntax for the system obligation deﬁnition. The three kind of obligations are
distinguished using a preﬁx on the obligation-id attribute. For a user or collective
obligation we deﬁned special attributes for the user or the team that is responsible for its
fulﬁlment and for the speciﬁcation of the deadline.
We believe that, with this work, we have developed a ﬂexible model for the implementation
of a generic RAAC system that can be easily built upon an existing access control system (e.g.
based on RBAC). The model supports user obligations and system obligations and can be easily
extended to support new types of mitigation methods. The introduction of the budget deposit
mechanism encourages user to fulﬁl their obligation. We also introduced a mechanism that allows
sharing of permissions and responsibilities through. Moreover, the proposed implementation is
compliant with the XACML standard and thus supports all its features, like the development of
distributed access control system, policy hierarchy and separation of decision and enforcement
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